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INTRODUCTION 
There are many myths about the role of courts in foreign affairs and 
national security in Western democracies. Traditionally, courts and scholars in 
different jurisdictions have taken the view that executive action related to foreign 
affairs has unique attributes, making it ill-suited for review by unelected judges 
with limited institutional competence.1 This approach has relied on a 
combination of functional considerations and concerns about the democratic 
legitimacy of judicial interference with inherently political foreign and security 
policies. 
From a functional perspective, one common claim is that courts lack the 
necessary expertise to handle complex, fast-evolving, and sensitive foreign 
affairs and national security issues.2 Another common claim is that judicial 
interference would slow down the Executive and compromise coherence and 
secrecy, which are essential to the conduct of foreign affairs.3 Louis Henkin 
observed that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of the judicial 
process, which aims to produce relatively stable rules of general applicability in 
 
 1. In the U.S. context, see, for example, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98 (2d ed. 1986); ERIC A. POSNER & 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 18 (2007) (“In 
emergencies, the judges have no sensible alternative but to defer heavily to executive action, and the 
judges know this.”); Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 507, 527-43 (2011); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941 
(2004); and Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170, 1204-07 (2007). 
 While other American scholars have generally acknowledged the tradition of increased judicial 
deference in foreign affairs and national security as a descriptive matter, they have argued in favor of 
judicial review in those areas. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL 
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 146-48, 218-
24 (1990); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 805 (1989); 
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1897 (2015); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1980 (1993) 
(review of FRANCK, supra). 
 For other jurisdictions, see GEERT DE BAERE, CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EU EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS 197 (2008) (“A survey of the world’s constitutional traditions suggests that courts tend not to 
get involved in substantive foreign policy decisions and leave the political institutions (normally the 
executive) a large margin of discretion, although the desirability and extent of this margin is open to 
discussion”); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 219-57 (2014) (covering four common 
law jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom); Eyal Benvenisti, Judges 
and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “The Activities of 
National Courts and the International Relations of Their State”, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423 (1994); Daphne 
Barak-Erez, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Review in Israel: Between Activism and Restraint, 3 INDIAN 
J. CONST. L. 118, 122-123 (2009); and Laura K. Donohue, The Perilous Dialogue, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 
385-89 (2009) (discussing deference to the executive on national security matters in the United States and 
the United Kingdom). 
 2. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 1, at 46-48; Charney, supra note 1, at 809-10; Posner & 
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1205-06; Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1936-38. 
 3. See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 1, at 1938-44. 
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a principled manner, and the flexibility and agility necessary for the conduct of 
foreign affairs.4 Furthermore, some scholars have argued that there are simply 
no workable legal standards to apply to decisions related to inherently political 
foreign affairs and national security issues.5 
The familiar democratic legitimacy argument has been that the conduct of 
foreign affairs invariably requires value judgments and the balancing of strategic 
interests.6 The political branches of government, not courts, should be making 
these judgments because they are accountable to the public. Moreover, some 
scholars have warned that because the stakes in foreign affairs are often 
exceptionally high, courts risk confrontation with the other branches of 
government and even disobedience when judges weigh in on foreign affairs and 
national security.7 
However, the traditional notion that foreign affairs and national security 
matters are uniquely inappropriate for judicial review has come under pressure 
in scholarly debates and, perhaps more importantly, in practice.8 Since 9/11, 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic have adjudicated a growing number of 
foreign affairs and national security cases, as detainees, sanctioned entities, and 
other individuals claiming that they had been injured by foreign and security 
policies have sought judicial remedies.9 The rising number of foreign affairs 
 
 4. Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 805, 826 (1964). 
 5. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 186. But see FRANCK, supra note 1, at 48-50; KOH, supra 
note 1, at 221-22 (criticizing this argument). 
 6. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1206. 
 7. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 1, at 426. But see FRANCK, supra note 1, at 50-60; KOH, 
supra note 1, at 221-22 (criticizing such arguments). 
 8. For scholarly critiques of foreign affairs “exceptionalism,” see FRANCK, supra note 1; KOH, 
supra note 1; and Charney, supra note 1. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas 
Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 396 
(2010) (“[E]ven as the [U.S.] Supreme Court has stayed far from the center of the nation’s War on Terror 
policy, it has, through its jurisdictional and procedural rulings, cautiously extended the margins along 
which judicial power can operate.”); Aziz Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 225, 226 (2009) [hereinafter Huq, Against Exceptionalism] (“[T]here is nothing sui generis about 
the behavior of courts in instances of national security exigency, or at least . . . the thesis of [national 
security] exceptionalism is overstated.”); Aziz Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 
100 CALIF. L. REV 887 (2012) (criticizing U.S. courts for relying on separation of powers doctrine in 
counterterrorism cases and arguing that courts should assess the legality of counterterrorism policies using 
ordinary doctrinal tools); Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 89 (2012) 
(analyzing the evolution of judicial deference in national security cases after 9/11); Sitaraman & Wuerth, 
supra note 1 (documenting the process of normalization in the legal treatment of foreign affairs in the 
United States). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from 
“Exceptionalism”, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294 (2015); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Exceptionalism of Foreign 
Relations Normalization, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 322 (2015). 
 The tradition of increased judicial deference in foreign affairs and national security has come under 
pressure in other common law jurisdictions as well. See MCLACHLAN, supra note 1, at 219-232; Thomas 
Poole, The Constitution and Foreign Affairs, 69 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 143, 145 (2016) (discussing 
the United Kingdom and asserting that “courts are certainly handling more, and more significant, cases 
involving foreign affairs”). 
 9. See, e.g., Vanessa Baehr-Jones, Mission Possible: How Intelligence Evidence Rules Can 
Save UN Terrorist Sanctions, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 447, 449 (2011) (“Lawsuits contesting [U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1267] have been ongoing in the United States, Belgium, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Switzerland, and Turkey.”); Douglas Cantwell, A Tale of Two Kadis: Kadi II, Kadi 
v. Geithner & U.S. Counterterrorism Finance Efforts, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 652 (2015); Christina 
Eckes, Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Consequences of the Court’s Extended Jurisdiction, 
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cases adjudicated on the merits in different jurisdictions creates new 
opportunities for empirically-informed evaluations of how judicial decisions 
interact with foreign and security policies in practice.10 
This Article offers an empirical inquiry into one such dynamic between 
courts and policymakers, through a case study of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (CJEU) targeted economic sanctions jurisprudence. It utilizes 
the large number of EU sanctions cases and the constant back-and-forth between 
EU policymakers and courts over sanctions to study the practical consequences 
of the CJEU’s particular form of judicial intervention in foreign affairs—namely, 
due process review. In its assessment of procedural judicial review in the EU 
targeted sanctions context, this Article draws on theoretical predictions about the 
impact of procedural judicial review on policy. 
For more than a decade now, EU courts have been conducting rigorous 
judicial review of hundreds of targeted sanctions imposed by the European 
Union against natural and legal persons in the framework of its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP).11 This review includes both sanctions imposed 
under the EU counterterrorism regimes and third-State sanctions targeting non-
EU States.12 In deciding sanctions cases, EU courts have walked a fine line 
between protecting designated persons and entities from arbitrary designation 
and overtly interfering with EU foreign policy. They have therefore consistently 
recognized the primacy of EU political institutions in foreign and security 
policymaking. When the courts struck down sanctions, they did so only on due 
process grounds, such as the European Union’s failure to state the reasons 
supporting its decision to place a particular entity under sanctions or to provide 
sufficient evidence to substantiate those reasons. EU courts have explicitly left 
the door open for the Council of the European Union (the Council) to fix the 
identified procedural flaws and re-designate persons and entities that prevailed 
in court, if the Council finds that keeping them under sanctions is necessary in 
light of its policy goals. 
The CJEU sanctions case law has attracted much scholarly attention, 
 
22 EUR. L.J. 492, 510 (2016) [hereinafter Eckes, Consequences] (“A general carte blanche for the 
executive in the field of foreign policy no longer exists in any of the [EU] Member States.”); Christina 
Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures Against Natural and Legal Persons: From Counterterrorism to Third 
Country Sanctions, 51 COMMON MARKETS L. REV. 869 (2014) [hereinafter Eckes, EU Restrictive 
Measures]; Maya Lester & Brian Kennelly, Judicial Review of Sanctions Decisions: The Wrong Point in 
the Wrong Court with the Wrong Defendant?, 18 JUDICIAL REV. 206 (2013) (discussing targeted sanctions 
cases in the United Kingdom); Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical 
Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269 (2008) (providing data on post-9/11 U.S. national security cases); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Demise of Merits-Based Adjudication in Post-9/11 National Security Litigation, 
64 DRAKE L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2016) (“Even by conservative estimates, there have been hundreds of civil 
lawsuits brought over the past 14-plus years challenging some aspect of post-9/11 national security or 
counterterrorism policies.”); Huq, Against Exceptionalism, supra note 8 (analyzing post-9/11 detention 
cases in the United States); Poole, supra note 8. 
 10. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010) (empirically 
studying the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), on 
U.S. detention policy). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See EUR. COMM., EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES (SANCTIONS) IN FORCE (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive_measures-2017-08-04.pdf [hereinafter LIST OF 
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN FORCE]. 
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particularly in the aftermath of the Kadi litigation.13 A significant number of 
scholars have debated the implications of the Kadi decisions for the relationship 
between the EU legal order and international law,14 while other commentators 
have focused on the doctrinal aspects of CJEU decisions and the individual rights 
concerns arising from EU targeted sanctions practices.15 This study approaches 
the CJEU case law from a more comprehensive empirical perspective. It focuses 
not just on courts but also on the interplay and dialogue between EU courts and 
policymakers. 
The study relies on an original dataset I constructed that includes 204 
decisions issued by EU courts between July 2009 and March 2017. The decisions 
reviewed the legality of individual financial sanctions imposed by the European 
Union in the framework of its Iran and Syria sanctions regimes. The study traces 
how the EU Council responded to judicial intervention, at both the particular and 
the general level. For each individual sanction that the courts struck down, the 
study collected data on two additional variables: whether the Council appealed 
the decision, and whether it reimposed the sanction in question after it was struck 
down. In addition to documenting the Council’s specific reactions to each 
decision, the study explores how judicial intervention influenced the general 
criteria for imposing sanctions in the EU sanctions measures concerning Iran and 
Syria. 
The findings of the empirical study suggest that judicial review had an 
impact on both substantive EU policy decisions and the Council’s compliance 
with due process obligations. Although judicial annulment of sanctions 
ultimately did not change the situation of designated persons and entities in the 
majority of the cases in the dataset, sanctions were not reimposed in almost a 
third of the cases. This Article argues that the significant percentage of cases in 
which the Council did not reimpose sanctions struck down by the courts suggests 
that judicial review was successful in eliciting policymakers’ preferences as to 
which individual sanctions were actually essential to achieving EU policy goals 
with regard to Iran and Syria, in eliminating excessive sanctions, and in 
encouraging the Council to adhere to more robust procedures before imposing 
sanctions. 
 
 13. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (Grand 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) [hereinafter Kadi I]; Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P, Comm’n v. 
Kadi, EU:C:2013:518 (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J.) [hereinafter Kadi II]. Kadi I established that individual 
designations by the U.N. Security Council are subject to and must comply with the fundamental rights 
recognized in EU law. For discussion of Kadi II, see infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal 
Order after Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1 (2010); Guy Harpaz, Judicial Review by the European Court of 
Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi Dispute, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 65 
(2009); N. Türküler Isiksel, Fundamental Rights in the EU After Kadi and Al Barakaat, 16 EUR. L.J. 551 
(2010); Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and 
International Law – Finding the Balance?, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1015 (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., EU SANCTIONS: LAW AND POLICY ISSUES CONCERNING RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 
(Iain Cameron ed., 2013) [hereinafter SANCTIONS: LAW AND POLICY]; CHRISTINA ECKES, EU COUNTER-
TERRORIST POLICIES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE CASE OF INDIVIDUAL SANCTIONS (2009); 
Federico Fabbrini, Global Sanctions, State Secrets and Supranational Review: Seeking Due Process in an 
Interconnected World, in SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 284 (David Cole, Federico Fabbrini and Arianna Vedaschi eds., 2013); Eckes, EU Restrictive 
Measures, supra note 9. 
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The findings further suggest that procedural judicial review could 
successfully reconcile some degree of oversight of foreign policy and national 
security measures with institutional concerns that have long stood in the way of 
judicial review in those areas. By leaving substantive policy judgments to the 
EU Council while enforcing strict due process requirements, procedural review 
facilitated a dynamic of accountability without substantially hindering the 
Council’s ability to achieve its policy goals. 
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the argument here is not that 
courts should review executive and legislative acts in the areas of foreign affairs 
and national security. As the snapshot of the theoretical debate above 
demonstrates, whether this is a legitimate exercise of judicial power is a deeply 
contested normative question, and answering it is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. Rather, this Article aims to assess what happens when courts do weigh 
in. It provides an empirically-grounded analysis of how procedural judicial 
review of foreign affairs and national security measures actually operates in 
practice. While this analysis will likely not assuage the concerns of those who 
believe that courts simply lack democratic legitimacy to intervene in foreign 
affairs and national security matters, it does illuminate the extent to which 
functional limitations affect the ability of courts to handle such matters. It should 
therefore be of interest to both champions and skeptics of judicial review in 
foreign affairs and national security. 
Parts I and II introduce the policy and judicial components of the case 
study—the EU foreign policymaking framework in the area of sanctions, and the 
main principles governing CJEU judicial review of sanctions. Part III explains 
the methodology of the empirical study and Part IV describes its findings. Based 
on the empirical findings, Part V then considers whether procedural review 
successfully balanced foreign policy interests, judicial competence, and 
individual rights. 
I. THE MAKING OF EU SANCTIONS 
This Part provides the essential background to the empirical study at the 
heart of this Article. It begins with a brief overview of the constitutional 
framework for EU foreign and security policy under the EU treaties. It then 
describes the EU sanctions decision-making process, as well as the development 
and structure of the EU Iran and Syria sanctions regimes. 
A. EU Foreign and Security Policy 
It is perhaps counter-intuitive to speak of an EU foreign policy, considering 
that the European Union is a supranational organization and that EU member 
States advance their own independent foreign and security policies. In practice, 
however, the European Union plays a significant role in conducting foreign 
policy on behalf of its member States. That role has been reinforced since the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.16 
 
 16. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
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Post-Lisbon, the Treaty on European Union (TEU)17 and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)18 empower the European Union to 
develop and implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).19 Article 
21(2) of the TEU provides that, “The Union shall define and pursue common 
policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields 
of international relations,” in order to promote a variety of policy goals from 
peace and security to economic development.20 Article 24(1) of the TEU further 
provides that “The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and 
security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating 
to the Union’s security . . . .”21 The EU treaties thus confer wide-ranging powers 
upon the European Union in the area of foreign and security policy. 
The mechanics of CFSP are complex. Many actors are involved in its 
making, including member States, the EU political organs, the Brussels 
bureaucracy, and, in some respects, the EU courts.22 At the political level, two 
major decision-making bodies navigate CFSP. The European Council, which 
consists of the leaders of all member States, sets forth the strategic goals and 
priorities of the CFSP. The Council of the European Union (the Council) 
oversees the implementation of those general principles and hashes out the 
details of different policies with the help of its supporting bureaucracy.23 
Of course, member States play a crucial role in shaping CFSP through their 
representatives in the political decision-making bodies. They also share the 
 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. The Treaty 
introduced reforms that further entrenched the role of the EU institutions in the area of CFSP. It created 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), and consolidated the authorities of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is now the equivalent of a foreign minister. 
Christophe Hillion observes that “[CFSP] is a policy that is arguably more incorporated than ever within 
the EU constitutional order, as its definition and implementation are increasingly determined by the 
Union’s structures.” Christophe Hillion, A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 47, 47-48 (Marise Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014); see also, 
e.g., Deirdre M. Curtin & Ige F. Dekker, The European Union from Maastricht to Lisbon: Institutional 
and Legal Unity Out of The Shadows, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 155 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de 
Búrca eds., 2d ed. 2011); Piet Eeckhout, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: 
From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism, in EU LAW AFTER LISBON 265 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2012). 
 17. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13 
[hereinafter TEU]. 
 18. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008, 
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 19. TEU, supra note 17, Title V, Chapter 2; TFEU, supra note 18, art. 2(4) (“The Union shall 
have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy.”). 
 20. TEU, supra note 17, art. 21(2). 
 21. TEU, supra note 17, art. 24(1). 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. TEU, supra note 17, art. 26. The Council is comprised of ministerial-level representatives 
from each member State meeting in different configurations according to the subject-matter. One of these 
configurations, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), is the political organ in charge of EU external action. 
The FAC is chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and is staffed by 
several working groups in Brussels, led by the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States (COREPER). See Council Decision 2009/937/EU of Dec. 1, 2009, 
2009 O.J. (L 325) 35 (EU) (adopting the Rules of Procedure of the EU Council). 
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burden of implementing EU policies within their domain.24 Member States 
submit initiatives and proposals to the Council, thereby influencing its agenda.25 
EU institutions depend on member States, particularly in areas in which policy 
relies heavily on intelligence and investigative capabilities, such as 
counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and sanctions.26 The European Union 
primarily relied on information from one or more of the member States as the 
basis for imposing individual sanctions against persons and entities in the cases 
surveyed for this study. 
B. Sanctions Decision-Making 
Sanctions, or restrictive measures, are the most significant coercive tool 
available to the European Union in the CFSP area. While the European Union 
has no common military force or intelligence service, it is one of the world’s 
major economic powers. It can therefore exert substantial influence through 
economic means. The European Union has invoked the sanctions tool 
extensively and increasingly in recent years.27 According to the latest EU List of 
Restrictive Measures in Force, the European Union has CFSP sanctions in force 
against no fewer than thirty-six States, as well as against al-Qaeda, the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other “foreign terrorist organisations.”28 
Most of the CFSP-related legal instruments the Council adopts are related to 
sanctions, as are most of the CFSP court cases.29 Sanctions therefore take up a 
large chunk of the EU foreign policymaking process and consume substantial 
resources. 
EU CFSP sanctions can be derivative (implementing U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions) or autonomous (imposed independently by the European 
Union). They can target States as such (third-State sanctions), specific sectors 
and industries within States, or natural and legal persons (individual or 
“targeted” sanctions). EU third-State sanctions regimes often combine different 
categories of sanctions.30 
 
 24. TEU, supra note 17, art. 26(3). Article 24(3) also imposes an obligation on member States 
to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly” and “refrain from any 
action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations.” 
 25. Id. art. 30(1). 
 26. See, e.g., Christina Eckes, Sanctions Against Individuals –Fighting Terrorism Within the 
European Legal Order, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 205, 208 (2008) [hereinafter Eckes, Sanctions]; Christina 
Eckes, Decision-Making in the Dark? Autonomous EU Sanctions and National Classification, in 
SANCTIONS: LAW AND POLICY, supra note 15, at 177 [hereinafter Eckes, Decision-Making]. 
 27. See Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures, supra note 9, at 872-73; Dina Esfandiary, Assessing 
the European Union’s Sanctions Policy: Iran as a Case Study 2 (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-
Proliferation Paper No. 34, Dec. 2013), http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonproliferation
papers/dinaesfandiary52b41ff5cbaf6.pdf (“In recent years, the EU’s use of coercive measures has 
increased exponentially.”). See generally Stefan Lehne, The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy, 
CARNEGIE EUROPE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50378 (describing the 
expansion of the European Union’s use of sanctions). 
 28. See LIST OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN FORCE, supra note 12. 
 29. See Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures, supra note 9, at 873. 
 30. For example, the Iran and Syria sanctions measures combined country, sector-wide, and 
individual sanctions. See infra Sections I.C, I.D. 
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Imposing EU sanctions typically requires Council decisions and 
regulations. Sanctions measures are prepared in cooperation among member 
States, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the 
Brussels bureaucracy. Their adoption depends on the political will of the twenty-
eight States currently voting in the Council.31 Although the sanctions adoption 
process may appear rather cumbersome considering the number of participants 
with diverging interests and the politics involved, the various EU sanctions 
regimes are flexible, and changes occur relatively often. In order to stay effective 
and relevant, sanctions lists must be amended and updated to reflect 
developments in policy, to keep up with efforts to circumvent sanctions, to 
incorporate new information, and to comply with legal requirements.32 
The European Union imposes individual sanctions against persons or 
entities based on rules and criteria predetermined by the Council in its decisions 
and regulations establishing a particular sanctions regime. The Council now 
administers numerous lists of designated natural and legal persons subject to 
such restrictions as travel bans that prohibit admission to EU member States; 
EU-wide asset freezes that deny designated persons access to assets within EU 
jurisdiction; and prohibitions against providing certain services.33 
C. EU Iran Sanctions 
At its prime, the Iran sanctions regime was the most comprehensive in EU 
 
 31. The process is typically initiated by a proposal from member States or the High 
Representative. The Council’s supporting bureaucracy, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and 
geographical working groups, then discuss the proposal in detail. A legal drafting group (RELEX) reviews 
the proposal. Finally, COREPER and the Council approve the sanctions proposal by unanimously 
adopting a Council decision. TEU, supra note 17, arts. 29, 31(1). Council decisions implementing existing 
decisions may be adopted by a qualified majority. TEU, supra note 17, art. 31(2). As explained infra in 
note 33, in some cases the Council must also adopt regulations in order to implement certain types of 
sanctions provided for in its decisions. See Adoption and Review Procedure for EU Sanctions, EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL & COUNCIL OF THE EU, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/adoption-
review-procedure [hereinafter Adoption Procedure]; Francesco Giumelli, How EU Sanctions Work: A 
New Narrative, EU INST. FOR SECURITY STUD. 10-12 (May 2013), https://www.iss.europa.eu
/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Chaillot_129.pdf. The EEAS also plays a role in sanctions coordination 
and preparation. See Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures, supra note 9, at 884. 
 32. See Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures, supra note 9, at 873 (“In the four years since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has adopted countless legal instruments, imposing, amending, 
or repealing targeted sanctions.”); LIST OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN FORCE, supra note 12 (chronicling 
the frequent changes in the EU sanctions regimes). 
 33. See Consolidated List of Sanctions, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/sanctions-policy/8442/consolidated-list-of-sanctions_en (last visited Nov. 
10, 2018). It is important to note that travel bans are implemented by EU member States, while individual 
asset freezes and other economic measures are implemented through Council regulations. See Adoption 
Procedure, supra note 31. The legal basis for Council regulations imposing sanctions, post-Lisbon, is 
Article 215 of the TFEU, and the sanctions are adopted by a qualified majority. See Case C-130/10, 
European Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472 (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J.) (confirming that Article 215 
of the TFEU is the legal basis for all CFSP individual economic sanctions post-Lisbon). Article 215 
replaced Articles 301, 60, and 308 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), which 
governed EU restrictive measures pre-Lisbon. It clarified, in accordance with pre-Lisbon practice, that the 
EU authority to use restrictive measures extends not only to third States but also to individuals and non-
State actors. See generally, Marise Cremona, EU Competence, ‘Smart Sanctions’, and the Kadi Case, 28 
Y.B. EUR. L. 559 (2009) (surveying the pre-Lisbon legal environment concerning individual sanctions 
and the changes the Treaty introduced). 
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sanctions history, and it played a crucial role in the overall EU policy on Iran.34 
Iran has been under international scrutiny over its nuclear program since 2002 
due to suspicions that it had engaged in nuclear development for military 
purposes. The international community addressed the issue through diplomacy, 
followed by international sanctions. For almost a decade between December 
2006 and January 2016, Iran was subject to international sanctions aimed at 
curtailing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in order to force Iran into 
negotiations towards a long-term settlement of the nuclear issue. The Iran 
nuclear sanctions consisted of U.N. Security Council sanctions as well as 
bilateral efforts led by the United States and the European Union.35 
The European Union was responsible for a large portion of the international 
sanctions against Iran. Between 2007 and 2010, the European Union 
implemented three U.N. Security Council Iran resolutions, without significantly 
adding to U.N. sanctions through autonomous EU measures.36 The sanctions 
imposed during that period focused on Iran’s proliferation activities and arms 
trade, alongside designations of individual persons and entities. The year 2010 
marked a shift in EU Iran sanctions policy. The Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1929 that year, which paved the way for far more aggressive 
sanctions compared to those in previous resolutions. For the first time, the 
Security Council recognized the link between revenue Iran derives from its 
energy sector and the funding of its nuclear proliferation activities. The Security 
Council also called upon States to limit cooperation with Iran’s financial sector.37 
Subsequently, the European Union adopted autonomous measures that 
went considerably beyond the U.N. Security Council framework. The new EU 
sanctions imposed in late 2010 included additional restrictions on trade in dual-
use goods and technology with Iran; restrictions on trade and investment in key 
equipment and technology for the Iranian oil and gas industry; restrictions on 
Iranian investment in the uranium mining and nuclear industry; restrictions on 
transfers of funds to and from Iran; restrictions concerning the Iranian banking 
sector; restrictions on Iran’s access to EU insurance and bonds markets; and 
restrictions on providing certain services to Iranian ships and cargo aircraft. The 
new EU sanctions measures also expanded the list of designated persons and 
entities under the EU Iran sanctions regime.38 After 2010, the European Union 
 
 34. See SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: A GUIDE TO TARGETS, TERMS AND TIMETABLES (Gary 
Samore ed., 2015), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Iran%20Sanctions
.pdf. 
 35. Id., at 3-11; S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010); S.C. Res. 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1803 
(Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 
2006). Resolutions 1696 and 1835 did not impose any sanctions. 
 36. See Council Regulation 423/2007 of Apr. 19, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 103) 1 (EC), repealed by 
Council Regulation 961/2010 of Oct. 25, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Council Regulation 
961/2010]; Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP of Feb. 27, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 61) 49 (EU) 
(implementing Security Council Resolution 1737), amended by Council Common Position 
2007/246/CFSP of Apr. 23, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 106) 67 (EU) (implementing Security Council Resolution 
1747), repealed by Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of July 26, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 39 (EU) 
[hereinafter Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP]. 
 37. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 35, pmbl., ¶¶ 21-24. 
 38. Immediately following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1929 in June 2010, the 
European Council invited the FAC to adopt measures to implement the Resolution, “as well as 
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further updated and expanded its Iran nuclear and proliferation-related sanctions, 
both those targeting different sectors within Iran and those targeting Iranian 
persons and entities.39 
However, the EU nuclear sanctions against Iran were relaxed pursuant to 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in July 2015.40 
Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to a series of concessions concerning its nuclear 
program in return for sanctions relief.41 Subsequently, on January 16, 2016, 
known as JCPOA “implementation day,” the United States and the European 
Union lifted most of the sanctions imposed in connection with Iran’s nuclear 
program, subject to a snap-back mechanism to be triggered if Iran reneges on its 
commitments. Some proliferation-related sanctions, however, were kept in 
place. In addition, the JCPOA did not affect non-nuclear sanctions, such as EU 
human rights sanctions against Iran. On implementation day, 331 persons and 
entities designated over Iran’s nuclear program—the vast majority of the 
individual Iran sanctions—were removed from the sanctions list.42 While the 
United States pulled out of the JCPOA in May 2018 and reimposed nuclear 
sanctions lifted in the framework of the agreement, the European Union remains 
committed to the JCPOA and has not revoked related sanctions relief.43 
D. EU Syria Sanctions 
The European Union first imposed sanctions against Syria in 2011 to 
 
accompanying measures . . . . These should focus on the areas of trade, especially dual use goods and 
further restrictions on trade insurance; the financial sector, including freeze of additional Iranian banks 
and restrictions on banking and insurance; the Iranian transport sector, in particular the Islamic Republic 
of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL) and its subsidiaries and air cargo; key sectors of the gas and oil industry . . 
. and new visa bans and asset freezes especially on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).” 
Council Conclusions EUCO 13/10 of June 17, 2010, Annex II (Declaration on Iran) 14 (EU), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf. In line with these guidelines, the 
Council subsequently adopted Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation 961/2010. 
 39. See, e.g., Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of Oct. 15, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 282) 58 (EU); 
Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of Mar. 15, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 77) 18 (EU); Council Decision 
2012/35/CFSP of Jan. 23, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 19) 22 (EU) [hereinafter Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP]; 
Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP of Apr. 12, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 100) 51 (EU). 
 40. The text of the JCPOA was annexed to S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015). 
 41. Iran already enjoyed modest sanctions relief pursuant to the interim JPOA agreement. See 
Joint Plan of Action, Nov. 24, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements/docs/2013/131124_
03_en.pdf. 
 42. Council Decision 2015/1863/CFSP of Oct. 18, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 274) 174 (EU); Council 
Regulation 2015/1861 of Oct. 18, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 274) 1 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 
2015/1862 of Oct. 18, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 274) 161 (EU) [hereinafter Council Implementing Regulation 
2015/1863] (delisting 331 Iranian persons and entities). See also EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, 
INFORMATION NOTE ON EU SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED UNDER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF 
ACTION (JCPOA) 6-7, 17-20 (Jan. 23, 2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/iran_
implementation/information_note_eu_sanctions_jcpoa_en.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Implementation Day Statement (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/jcpoa_implementation.aspx; Press Release 12/16, Council of 
the European Union, Iran: Council Lifts all Nuclear-related Economic and Financial EU Sanctions (Jan. 
16, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/01/16-iran-council-lifts-all-
nuclear-related-eu-sanctions/. 
 43. See Elena Chachko, Trump Withdraws from the Iran Nuclear Agreement: What Comes Next, 
LAWFARE (May 8, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-withdraws-iran-nuclear-agreement-what-
comes-next. 
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address the violent repression of civilian protests in the country.44 As the 
situation in Syria continued to deteriorate, the European Union extended and 
updated those sanctions from time to time, reiterating that it would continue 
imposing sanctions against the Assad regime and its supporters for as long as the 
repression continues.45 
Similar to the Iran sanctions regime, EU sanctions against Syria consist of 
both sector-wide measures and individual designations. This includes an oil 
embargo and additional restrictions on Syria’s energy sector; an arms embargo; 
a ban on the provision of equipment that could be used for internal repression; 
restrictions on trade in luxury goods and precious metals; restrictions on 
financing certain enterprises in Syria and infrastructure projects; and other 
restrictions on financial cooperation and trade.46 In contrast to the Iran sanctions 
regime, however, all EU Syria sanctions are autonomous sanctions. The Security 
Council has thus far failed to impose sanctions against the Assad regime. As of 
May 2018, 259 persons and 67 entities have been designated under the Syria 
sanctions regime.47 
II. CJEU JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CFSP SANCTIONS 
The previous Part outlined the EU CFSP decision-making framework and 
explained the process of imposing sanctions, zeroing in on the Iran and Syria 
sanctions regimes. This Part turns to the role of the CJEU courts—specifically 
the General Court (GC) and the Court of Justice (CJEU). It explains the 
constitutional sources of CJEU jurisdiction to review EU sanctions and the 
doctrine EU courts have developed in related case law. It then describes the 
procedural reforms in the EU sanctions process introduced in response to early 
CJEU targeted sanctions decisions. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Article 275 of the TFEU explicitly provides that the CJEU “shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and 
security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those 
provisions.”48 The Treaty therefore codifies the traditional approach that courts 
 
 44. Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of May 9, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 121) 11 (EU); Council 
Regulation 442/2011 of May 9, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 121) 11 (EU); see also Fact Sheet, The EU and the 
Crisis in Syria, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (Sep. 24, 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu
/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/22664/eu-and-crisis-syria_en. 
 45. Press Release 762/16, Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High 
Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Situation in Aleppo, (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/09/hr-declaration-aleppo/. 
 46. See Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of May 31, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 147) 14 (EU) 
(consolidated version as amended); Council Regulation 36/2012 of January 18, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 16) 1 
(EU) (consolidated version as amended). 
 47. See Press Release 284/18, Council of European Union, Syria: EU Extends Sanctions against 
the Regime by One Year (May 28, 2018), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/05/28/syria-eu-extends-sanctions-against-the-regime-by-one-year. 
 48. See also TEU, supra note 17, art. 24(1) (“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
not have jurisdiction with respect to [provisions governing CFSP], with the exception of its jurisdiction 
to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as 
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should largely stay out of foreign and security policy. However, Article 275 of 
the TFEU provides for two exceptions to this rule.49 The CJEU has jurisdiction 
to police the separation of competences within the European Union in the area 
of CFSP. It also has jurisdiction to “rule on proceedings . . . reviewing the legality 
of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons 
adopted by the Council on the basis of” the TEU provisions governing the 
CFSP.50 The CJEU is thus empowered to adjudicate challenges brought by 
natural or legal persons contesting the legality of individual sanctions the 
European Union imposes in the CFSP context. Applications challenging 
sanctions are generally considered by the GC in the first instance, with appeal to 
the CJEU.51 
Since the early 2000s, many natural and legal persons designated under 
various EU sanctions regimes have taken advantage of the availability of judicial 
review and challenged their listing before the EU courts.52 To illustrate the 
significance of this phenomenon, in February 2013, a total of 117 cases regarding 
restrictive measures were pending before the EU courts, most concerning 
autonomous EU sanctions. At the time, approximately twenty percent (240) of 
the 1,200 individual listings under the different EU sanctions regimes were being 
challenged before the courts.53 The flow of applications to the GC challenging 
individual designations has continued since 2013, as this Article demonstrates. 
The sheer volume of litigation has been a serious challenge for EU policymakers, 
 
provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.”). 
 49. TFEU, supra note 18, art. 275. See also TFEU, supra note 18, art. 218(11), which creates a 
role for the CJEU in reviewing international agreements the EU negotiates. For discussion of the role of 
the CJEU in CFSP post-Lisbon, see Eckes, Consequences, supra note 9. 
 50. TFEU, supra note 18, art. 275. It is important to note that the Treaty of Lisbon only clarified 
the scope of CJEU jurisdiction over individual restrictive measures. EU courts already decided individual 
restrictive measures cases before it came into force in 2009. See, e.g., Case T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin 
Organization of Iran (PMOI) v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. II-03019 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-
266/05, Sison v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-01233 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-228/02, Organisation des 
Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-04665 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.); 
Kadi I, supra note 13; see also Hillion, supra note 16, at 50; Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures, supra note 
9, at 880-83. 
 51. The GC replaced the Court of First Instance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 52. See the cases cited at supra note 50; see also Kadi II, supra note 13; Case C-330/15 P, 
Tomana v. Council, EU:C:2016:601 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-200/13 P, Council v. Bank Saderat 
Iran, EU:C:2016:284 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-176/13 P, Council v. Bank Mellat, EU:C:2016:96 
(Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-605/13 P, Anbouba v. Council, EU:C:2015:248 (Grand Chamber) 
(E.C.J.); Case C-585/13, P Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG v. Council, EU:C:2015:145 (Fifth 
Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-348/12 P, Council v. Kala Naft, EU:C:2013:776 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); 
Case C-280/12 P, Council v. Fulmen, EU:C:2013:775 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-417/11 P, Council 
v. Bamba, EU:C:2012:718 (Third Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-376/10 P Tay Za v. Council, EU:C:2012:138 
(Grand Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-380/09 P, Melli Bank PLC v. Council, EU:C:2012:137 (Grand 
Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-548/09 P, Bank Melli Iran v. Council, 2011 E.C.R. I-11381 (Grand Chamber) 
(E.C.J.); Case C-27/09 P, France v. People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), 2011 E.C.R. I-
13427 (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J.). All the EU General Court decisions collected for this study regarding 
Iran and Syria individual sanctions are listed in the data file, available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol44/iss1/1/ [hereinafter the data file]. 
 53. See Council of Europe, Comm. of Legal Advisers on Public Int’l Law (CAHDI), U.N. 
Sanctions and Respect for Human Rights in the European Union 1 (March 2013), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/un_sanctions/European%20Union_UN_Sanctions_2013_EN.p
df; see also Eckes, Consequences, supra note 9, at 500-501. 
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but since designated persons and entities have an express treaty right to judicial 
review, there is little the Council can do to avoid litigation altogether. 
B. Standard of Review 
In reviewing individual sanctions the EU courts have repeatedly declared 
that they “must . . . ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the 
lawfulness of all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an 
integral part of the European Union legal order.”54 In practice, however, this “full 
review” has been limited to the procedural aspects of EU measures imposing 
individual sanctions. Although applicants have often argued that their 
designation violated the proportionality requirement under EU law or challenged 
the legality of listing criteria, when the courts struck down individual sanctions, 
they only did so on due process grounds. The courts have not delved into 
substantive questions, such as whether designating a particular person or entity 
is necessary as a matter of policy, or what the criteria for imposing sanctions 
within a particular EU regime ought to be.55 They have given virtually absolute 
deference to the EU Council when it came to the sanctions policies underlying 
individual designations, recognizing that the Council “must be allowed a broad 
discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its 
part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments.”56 
While the Council enjoyed substantial deference on the policy front, 
judicial scrutiny of its compliance with due process requirements in individual 
designations has been rigorous and arguably intrusive.57 The EU courts have 
reviewed whether the Council adhered to a set of procedural requirements 
 
 54. Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶ 97. 
 55. See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, EU JUSTICE SUB-
COMMITTEE, CORRECTED ORAL EVIDENCE: THE LEGALITY OF SANCTIONS 22-23 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/eu-sanctions/oral/41152.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING]. Michael Bishop, a 
senior legal adviser at the EU Council Legal Service, testified: “[T]he court is not the arbiter of whether 
a person should be listed, or whether it is right or proper to list someone. It does not rule in a general way 
like that. This is a policy decision for the Council to make.” Id. at 23. 
 56. Kala Naft, supra note 52, ¶¶ 120; see also, e.g., Case T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran v. Council, 
EU:T:2009:401, ¶¶ 35-38 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.); Joined Cases T-246/08 & T-332/08, Melli Bank 
PLC v. Council, EU:T:2009:266, ¶¶ 44-46 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.); OMPI, supra note 50, ¶ 159; 
Sison, supra note 50, ¶ 33. 
In several cases the courts rejected attempts by applicants to challenge general provisions in sanctions 
measures, as opposed to specific designations. See, e.g., Joined Cases T-14/14 & T-87/14, Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) v. Council, EU:T:2017:102 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.) [hereinafter 
IRISL II] (dismissing the application of IRISL and several other companies for the annulment, inter alia, 
of the criteria that served as the basis for their relisting); Case T-160/13, Bank Mellat v. Council, 
EU:T:2016:331 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.) (dismissing Bank Mellat’s action for the annulment of general 
provisions restricting financial ties with Iran); Case T-67/12, Sina Bank v. Council, EU:T:2014:348 (First 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) (dismissing Sina Bank’s challenge to the criteria for individual EU designations under 
the Iran sanctions regime). For discussion of the IRISL litigation see infra note 75 and the accompanying 
text, and infra Section IV.E. 
 57. According to Koen Lenaerts, the current President of the CJEU, the CJEU has employed a 
similar approach in contexts other than sanctions, in order to improve the decisions of the EU political 
branches without second guessing their policy choices. See Koen Lenaerts, The European Court of Justice 
and Process-oriented Review, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 2, 3 (2012) (“[J]udicial deference in relation to ‘substantive 
outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review.’”); see also Eckes, Consequences, supra 
note 9, at 517. 
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derived from two fundamental rights within the EU legal order: the right of 
defense and the right of effective judicial protection.58 The burden is on the 
Council to demonstrate that it complied with those requirements in a given case. 
In the sanctions context, the right of defense encompasses the right to be heard 
and the right to have access to the file containing the evidence supporting a 
particular designation, subject to confidentiality considerations. The right of 
effective judicial protection includes the obligation to state reasons and to 
provide a solid factual basis to support those reasons, which the courts could then 
review.59 
The obligation to state reasons is enshrined in Article 296 of the TFEU60 
as well as specific Council decisions and regulations imposing sanctions.61 
According to CJEU case law, the purpose of this obligation is to provide the 
party adversely affected by an EU act with sufficiently specific information to 
enable them to challenge that act before an EU court.62 Reasons must be provided 
simultaneously with the act (at the latest), in the absence of compelling interests 
related to the security of the European Union or of its member States or the 
conduct of their international relations.63 The EU courts have upheld sanctions 
if they found that at least one of the reasons provided by the Council was 
sufficiently detailed and substantiated.64 
What constitutes a sufficient statement of reasons? How detailed must it 
be? According to the EU courts, that depends on the particular circumstances of 
each case.65 Even a short statement of reasons could suffice, as long as it 
demonstrates that the listed person or entity in fact satisfies the listing criteria 
under the relevant sanctions measures. For the most part, the statements of 
reasons provided by the Council for Iran and Syria sanctions have been very 
brief—no longer than a paragraph.66 
Given the contextual approach of the EU courts, it is difficult to detect 
patterns in their statement-of-reasons assessments, although the case law 
provides some guidance. For instance, the courts have held that the Council may 
not list an individual based only on their position in a listed entity, without 
making an independent case against that individual.67 In other cases, the courts 
have maintained that mere restatement of the listing criteria is akin to providing 
 
 58. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 41, 47, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 391. TEU, supra note 17, art. 6(1) ascribes to the Charter the same “legal value” as the Treaties. 
 59. See, e.g., Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶¶ 99-100, 119-23. 
 60. TFEU, supra note 18, art. 296. 
 61. For example, see art. 36(3) of Council Regulation 961/2010, supra note 36. 
 62. See, e.g., Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶ 100. 
 63. See, e.g., OMPI, supra note 50, ¶¶ 138-41, 148. 
 64. See, e.g., Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶ 130; Fulmen, supra note 52, ¶ 64. 
 65. See Fulmen, supra note 52, ¶ 63; Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶ 102; Bamba, supra note 52, ¶ 53. 
 66. The reasons for each designation appear alongside the identifying information of the listed 
persons and entities in the annexes of Council decisions and regulations. The data file, supra note 52, 
contains all of the statements of reasons, original and amended, that the Council had provided for the 
persons and entities included in the dataset. 
 67. See, e.g., Case T-66/12, Sedghi v. Council, EU:T:2014:347, ¶ 69 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); 
Case T-58/12, Nabipour v. Council, EU:T:2013:640, ¶ 107 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Joined Cases T-
42/12 & T-181/12, Bateni v. Council, EU:T:2013:409, ¶¶ 64-66 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
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no reasons at all.68 But they have not been consistent in applying this rule. For 
example, the CJEU upheld the listing of the Central Bank of Iran only because 
it “provides financial support to the Government of Iran,” although that 
statement of reasons merely quoted one of the listing criteria in the Iran 
measures. A central bank, the Court held, necessarily provides financial support 
to the government it serves, and therefore the Council did not have to provide 
any additional reasons or evidence to support its designation.69 
The courts have generally not accepted the Council’s statements of reasons 
at face value. They have required the Council to provide supporting evidence 
and reviewed whether the Council had committed an “error of assessment” in 
determining that the evidence satisfies the listing criteria. The scope of the 
obligation to disclose evidence relied on in listing decisions was famously 
fleshed out in Kadi II. The CJEU held that while EU authorities are not required 
to produce all of the evidence underlying the reasons for a designation, the 
evidence provided must be sufficient to support those reasons. It also recognized 
that overriding security considerations might justify limiting the scope of 
disclosure, so that the Council would only be required to provide the designated 
person or entity with a summary conveying the essence of the classified 
material.70 In practice, however, the courts have not placed much stock in the 
Council’s recurring argument that it should not be required to produce classified 
evidence. When the Council was not able to share such evidence, the courts only 
considered the information before them, which often resulted in the annulment 
of the sanctions at issue.71 
For instance, in Council v. Fulmen, the CJEU upheld the annulment of the 
listing of an Iranian company and its director for their involvement in the 
installation of electrical equipment at the Qom/Fordow facility in Iran, a 
clandestine Uranium enrichment facility exposed in 2009.72 The Council, backed 
by France and the United Kingdom, argued that it could not disclose the evidence 
supporting the designation, provided to it by a member state, because the 
evidence was classified. The Council further argued that as a general matter, it 
should not be expected to provide evidence of the involvement of a designated 
entity in nuclear proliferation, considering the clandestine nature of that type of 
activity.73 The Court rejected these arguments, upholding the GC’s holding that 
 
 68. See Case T-53/12, CF Sharp Shipping Agencies v. Council, EU:T:2012:578, ¶ 38 (Fourth 
Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-421/11, Qualitest FZE v. Council, EU:T:2012:122, ¶ 33 (Fourth Chamber) 
(E.C.J.); OMPI, supra note 50, ¶ 143. 
 69. Case C-266/15, Central Bank of Iran v. Council, EU:C:2016:208 (Second Chamber) 
(E.C.J.). 
 70. Kadi II, supra note 13, ¶¶ 122-29. 
 71. See, e.g., Case T-181/13 Sharif University of Technology v. Council, EU:T:2014:607, 
¶¶ 54-55, 68-74 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-155/13 Zanjani v. Council, EU:T:2014:605, ¶¶ 68-
74 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-8/11 Bank Kargoshaei v. Council, EU:T:2013:470, ¶¶ 114-17 
(Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-110/12 Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Co. v. Council, 
EU:T:2013:411, ¶¶ 51-56 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-13/11 Post Bank Iran v. Council, 
EU:T:2013:402, ¶¶ 126-30 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-12/11 Iran Insurance Company v. Council, 
EU:T:2013:401, ¶¶ 122-26 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Joined Cases T-439/10 & T-440/10 Fulmen v. 
Council, EU:T:2012:142, ¶¶ 98-101 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Bank Mellat, supra note 52, ¶¶ 115-16. 
 72. Fulmen, supra note 52. 
 73. Fulmen, supra note 71, ¶¶ 100-01; Fulmen, supra note 52, ¶¶ 42-51. 
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the fact that the evidence was classified did not absolve the Council of the 
obligation to substantiate its case against Fulmen and its director.74 
In another case, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) v. 
Council, the GC annulled sanctions against IRISL and seventeen other 
companies on grounds of manifest error of assessment of the evidence.75 The 
Council initially listed IRISL based on two criteria: involvement in nuclear 
proliferation and helping listed entities evade sanctions. After the Court found 
that the reasons the Council provided for the listings under the second criterion 
were too vague, it went on to assess the facts supporting the listing based on 
IRISL’s involvement in nuclear proliferation. The Council rested its case on 
three incidents in which IRISL had transported military material in contravention 
of Security Council resolutions, arguing based on those incidents that there was 
a serious risk of IRISL transporting nuclear or missile-related materials as well. 
The Court held that the evidence provided by the Council did not support the 
claim that IRISL was involved in nuclear proliferation. The Court once again 
rejected the Council’s assertion that it could not identify specific shipments of 
material linked to nuclear proliferation due to the clandestine nature of such 
activities.76 
The recurring issue of treatment of classified material in sanctions cases 
motivated reforms in the CJEU Rules of Procedures, at the initiative of the EU 
courts, in order to put in place special procedures for considering confidential 
evidence.77 The new rules came into force in July 2015, but the provision 
regarding confidential evidence has yet to be invoked by an EU member State 
due to concerns that the new procedures do not allow sufficient protection of 
classified material.78 The provision therefore did not play a role in the cases 
reviewed for this study. 
The implication of the due process-oriented approach of the EU courts is 
that the Council is not barred from acting against a person or an entity whose 
listing the courts struck down. The Council may choose to correct the procedural 
flaw that the courts had identified by providing new reasons or more evidence 
and then relist the person or entity in question.79 The courts have generally 
 
 74. Fulmen, supra note 52, ¶¶ 77-83. 
 75. Case T-489/10, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Council, EU:T:2013:453 (Fourth 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) [hereinafter IRISL]. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 63-67. 
 77. Rules of Procedure of the General Court of Apr. 4, 2015, art. 105, 2015 O.J. (L 105) 1, 37 
(EU). Article 105 of the rules regulates “[t]reatment of information or material pertaining to the security 
of the Union or that of one or more of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations.” 
See also Maya Lester, Draft European Court Rules Propose Secret Hearings, EUR. SANCTIONS (Apr. 6, 
2014), https://europeansanctions.com/2014/04/06/draft-european-court-rules-for-secret-hearings; Maya 
Lester, UK Europe Minister Says New EU Closed Procedures Are Part of Adapting to “New 
Jurisprudential Reality” After Kadi, EUR. SANCTIONS (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://europeansanctions.com/2015/04/03/uk-europe-minister-says-new-eu-closed-procedures-are-part-
of-adapting-to-new-jurisprudential-reality-after-kadi. 
 78. Letter from Rt. Hon. Baroness Anelay of St. Johns DBE, Minister of State, Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, to Lord Boswell of Aynho, Chair of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
European Union (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-justice-
subcommittee/Brexit/GovresptoEUsanctionslistingrpt.pdf, at 3 [hereinafter U.K. Response Letter]. 
 79. See, e.g., PMOI, supra note 50, ¶¶ 65, 75 (“It is apparent from the case-law that, when a 
measure has been annulled for formal or procedural defects . . . the institution concerned is entitled to 
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suspended the effects of sanctions annulments to allow the Council to appeal to 
the CJEU or to reimpose the sanctions, recognizing that immediate annulment 
would compromise their effectiveness.80 Moreover, as the GC remarked in 
IRISL, the Council can amend listing criteria if it finds that existing criteria do 
not allow it to act as it believes necessary to achieve its policy goals.81 
C. Early Reforms 
In response to judicial annulments of sanctions on due process grounds in 
early EU counterterrorism sanctions cases, the EU Council introduced reforms 
to improve the procedures for imposing individual sanctions in order to comply 
with the standards set forth by the courts.82 Prior to those reforms, there were 
hardly any procedural safeguards in place in the EU designation process.83 The 
 
adopt afresh an identical measure, this time observing the formal and procedural rules in question . . . .”). 
The case law allows the Council substantial flexibility with regard to relisting decisions. For instance, the 
GC has held that in relisting a person or an entity, the Council may use a different criterion but rely on 
essentially the same factual basis that supported their original designation. Such relistings could be lawful 
even if the facts the Council relied on in the relisting measures predate the original designation. See, e.g., 
Case T-346/15, Bank Tejarat v. Council, EU:T:2017:164, ¶¶ 29, 36-39 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); IRISL II, 
supra note 56, ¶¶ 112-117; Case T-89/14, Export Development Bank of Iran v. Council, EU:T:2016:693, 
¶ 71 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-207/15, National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) v. Council, 
EU:T:2016:471, ¶¶ 40-68 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
 80. See, e.g., Bank Tejarat, supra note 79, ¶ 29; Case T-400/10, Hamas v. Council, 
EU:T:2014:1095, ¶ 145 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-565/12, NITC v. Council, EU:T:2014:608, 
¶ 77 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.) (finding immediate invalidation of the sanctions against the applicant 
would jeopardize the effectiveness of a potential Council decision to relist, by allowing the applicant to 
remove assets from EU jurisdiction). Unless the GC explicitly states otherwise in its judgment, the effects 
of annulled sanctions are maintained until the end of the period during which the Council may appeal to 
the CJEU (two months plus a grace period of ten days from the notification of the judgment). If the Council 
appeals, the sanctions remain in place until the CJEU rules on appeal. See TFEU, supra note 18, art. 264; 
Consolidated Version of Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
arts. 45, 56, 60, Sept. 5, 2008, 2018 O.J. (C 115) 210-29 (EU). 
 81. IRISL, supra note 75, ¶ 64: “[I]f the Council is of the opinion that the applicable legislation 
does not enable it to intervene in a sufficiently effective manner in order to combat nuclear proliferation, 
it is open to the Council to amend it in its role as legislator—subject to a review of lawfulness by the 
Courts of the European Union—so as to extend the situations in which restrictive measures may be 
adopted.” The Council went on to amend the listing criteria and relist IRISL and most of the other 
companies. The GC dismissed IRISL’s challenge to its relisting along with the other companies, 
reiterating that the Council is entitled to amend listing criteria in order to relist a person or an entity that 
had previously prevailed in court. See IRISL II, supra note 56, ¶¶ 79-85, 93-94, 193-195. 
 82. See Council of the European Union Press Release C/07/158, EU Terrorist List—Adoption 
of New Consolidated List (June 29, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-07-158_en.htm 
(“[I]mprovements have been agreed regarding the listing and de-listing procedures concerning those on 
the EU terrorist list, in the light of the Court of First Instance’s ruling . . . in the OMPI case.”); Council of 
the European Union doc. 10826/1/07, Fight Against the Financing of Terrorism—Implementation of 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (June 21, 2007) (elaborating on the due process measures to be taken). 
See also Eckes, Sanctions, supra note 26, at 218 (“In reaction to the CFI’s criticism in OMPI, the Council 
introduced a number of procedural safeguards to the adoption procedure of individual sanctions . . . . 
These requirements set out by the Council seem to address directly the CFI’s points of criticism in OMPI 
and Sison.”). 
 83. See HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING, supra note 55, at 1-2, 10, 19. See, in particular, the 
testimony of Maya Lester. Id. at 19 (“[T]he early [sanctions] cases concerned a regime in which no reasons 
at all were given and there was no notification that you were on a blacklist . . . . The first you might hear 
about it was when you suddenly discovered that you could not withdraw money.”). See also HOUSE OF 
LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE LEGALITY OF EU SANCTIONS (11TH REPORT 
OF SESSION 2016-17) 3 (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect
/ldeucom/102/102.pdf, [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS REPORT]. 
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Treaty of Lisbon itself responded to early sanctions litigation by inserting a 
provision into the TFEU that provides that EU measures imposing sanctions 
“shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards.”84 
In the framework of those procedural reforms, the Council undertook to 
issue notices to designated persons and entities about the measures taken against 
them and to provide them with reasons. The Council also created procedures to 
allow designated persons and entities to file observations and to request that their 
listing be reconsidered. Furthermore, the Council developed a mechanism for 
considering listing proposals from member States and entrenched periodic 
review of sanctions lists. Consequently, EU sanctions regimes are typically 
reviewed at least once a year,85 and sanctions measures now contain provisions 
requiring the Council to issue notices and provide statements of reasons to 
designated persons and entities.86 The EU Council has circulated several 
documents over the years outlining guidelines for adopting and implementing 
sanctions that address due process issues, among other things.87 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The previous Parts of the Article explore the decision-making framework 
on both the judicial and policy side of the EU sanctions equation. The next Parts 
turn to the empirical study of the dynamic between the two sides. Part III 
describes the methodology of the study and explains the dataset. Part IV will 
present the key findings of the empirical study in three main categories: case 
outcomes and appeals; post-invalidation relisting and related litigation; and 
changes in the listing criteria in the Iran and Syria sanctions regimes throughout 
the research period. 
 
 84. See TFEU, supra note 18, art. 215(3). See also Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference Which Adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration on Articles 75 and 215 
of the TFEU, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 335, 346 (EU). The Declarations address due process in the 
context of restrictive measures: “The Conference recalls that the respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms implies, in particular, that proper attention is given to the protection and observance of the due 
process rights of the individuals or entities concerned. For this purpose and in order to guarantee a 
thorough judicial review of decisions subjecting an individual or entity to restrictive measures, such 
decisions must be based on clear and distinct criteria. These criteria should be tailored to the specifics of 
each restrictive measure.” Id. 
 85. See HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING, supra note 55, at 10 (Matthew Findlay). 
 86. See, e.g., Council Regulation 267/2012 of March 23, 2012, art. 46, 2012 O.J. (L 88) 1 (EU) 
[hereinafter Council Regulation 267/2012] (concerning restrictive measures against Iran). 
 87. See Council of the European Union, Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)—Update of the EU 
Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures, Doc. 10254/15 (June 24, 2015); 
Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy—New Elements, Doc. 
9068/13 (April 30, 2013); Council of the European Union, Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation 
of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Doc. 11205/12 (June 15, 2012); Council of the European Union, Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)—
Update of the EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures, Doc. 8666/1/08 
REV1 (April. 24, 2008); Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures, Doc. 10198/1/04 REV1 (June 7, 2004); Council of the European Union, Guidelines on 
Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Doc. 15579/03 (Dec. 3, 2003). 
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A. The Dataset 
The dataset constructed for this study consists of 204 individual decisions 
delivered by the GC between July 9, 2009, and March 22, 2017.88 To the best of 
my knowledge, it includes all the available GC sanctions decisions reviewing 
designations concerning Iran’s nuclear program and the Syrian crisis from the 
first decision in July 2009 to the time of writing. 
I selected those two sanctions regimes for several reasons. First, both the 
Iran nuclear issue and the Syrian crisis were at the top of the EU foreign policy 
agenda—indeed, at the top of the global agenda—when the EU courts considered 
related sanctions cases. The nature of the issues allows us to assume that the 
policy stakes were salient to judges as they ruled on the validity of sanctions 
imposed under those regimes. Second, the two regimes implicate very different 
policy interests: the Iran sanctions were aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation, 
while the Syria sanctions were largely motivated by human rights concerns. The 
difference between the EU policy objectives for the two regimes allows us to 
evaluate whether judicial decisions and the Council’s responses are generally 
consistent across different policy areas. Finally, the Iran sanctions regime was 
chosen because it had generated the largest number of cases at the time of 
selection. 
In all of the cases in the dataset, the EU courts reviewed the legality of 
individual economic sanctions against natural and legal persons. The standard of 
review was as outlined in Section II.B of this paper. The applied doctrine and 
judicial rhetoric were generally consistent across Iran and Syria cases. All of the 
sanctions reviewed were autonomous EU sanctions, meaning that there was no 
parallel U.N. Security Council designation.89 The primary respondent was the 
EU Council. 
Of the 204 individual decisions in the dataset, 176 pertain to Iran and 28 
pertain to Syria.90 Most of the applicants in Syria cases were either prominent 
businesspeople or others said to have close ties with the Assad regime. 
Applicants in the Iran cases belonged primarily to the energy, banking, 
insurance, and shipping sectors, as detailed in Table 1. 
   
 
 88. The terms “decision” or “case” as defined for the purposes of this study refer to the outcome 
concerning each person or entity that had challenged their designation. The cases of several applicants 
were sometimes considered in the framework of a single judgment. 
 89. Note that I did not omit cases involving EU Iran or Syria sanctions that had parallel Security 
Council designations from the dataset. To the best of my knowledge, there were simply no such cases. All 
of the relevant cases of which I am aware involved autonomous EU sanctions. 
 90. The Iran decisions were issued by the first (71 cases, 41% of Iran cases), second (4, 2%), 
fourth (62, 35%) and seventh (39, 22%) chambers of the GC. The Syria cases were decided by the sixth 
(4 cases, 14% of Syria cases), seventh (21, 75%) and ninth (3, 11%) chambers. It is important to note, 
however, that the composition of each chamber changed during the research period. 
2019] Foreign Affairs in Court 21 
Table 1 – Iran sanctions by sector 
 
Sector Number of applicants 
Energy 41 (28%) 
Banking 27 (18%) 
Insurance 2 (1%) 
Shipping 73 (50%) 
Other 4 (3%) 
Total (unique applicants)91 147 (100%) 
 
A few clarifications are in order regarding the dataset. First, the dataset 
only includes cases in which the courts issued judgments on the merits of 
applications for the annulment of the reviewed sanctions.92 Second, the dataset 
excludes a few cases pertaining to Iran human rights and counterterrorism 
sanctions.93 Those categories of sanctions are not governed by the same set of 
Council decisions and regulations that governed the Iran nuclear sanctions 
during the research period, and they serve different policy objectives.94 
 
 91. This table reflects only “unique” applicants. The Syria cases were brought by twenty-two 
unique applicants. A number of the applicants in the dataset challenged their designation before the EU 
courts more than once. Those repeat challenges will be discussed further in Sections IV.A and IV.D. 
 92. Cases resolved without a judgment on the merits of an application for annulment of a 
designation were excluded from the dataset because they did not involve an assessment by the courts of 
the legality of the sanctions at issue. See, e.g., Case T-543/11, Ghreiwati v. Council, EU:T:2012:337 (Sixth 
Chamber) (E.C.J.). During the proceedings before the GC in Ghreiwati, the Council removed the 
applicant, designated under the Syria sanctions regime, from the list of designated persons. The applicant 
subsequently informed the GC that there was no longer a need to adjudicate, and the GC therefore issued 
an order to dismiss the case. See also Case T-328/14, Jannatian v. Council, EU:T:2016:86 (Seventh 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) (dismissing a claim for damages resulting from a designation based on request of 
applicant and absence of need to adjudicate); Case T-263/12, Kala Naft v. Council, EU:T:2014:228 (First 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) (ordering dismissal on the ground that the action was “manifestly lacking any 
foundation in law”); Case T-569/12, Marouf v. Council, EU:T:2014:701 (Ninth Chamber) (E.C.J.) 
(ordering dismissal based on the applicant’s request to discontinue the proceedings); Case T-550/11, 
Assad v. Council, EU:T:2012:266 (Sixth Chamber) (E.C.J.) (correcting an error in identification of a 
Syrian individual as a family member of Assad). According to one assessment, in 86 cases before 
November 2014, applications for annulment of sanctions across all policy areas (i.e., not just in Iran and 
Syria cases) have been withdrawn or removed from the court register. See Eckes, Consequences, supra 
note 9, at 501 n.43. 
 93. See, e.g., OMPI, supra note 50; PMOI, supra note 50. Note that these terrorism cases were 
decided prior to the research period. See also the first Iranian human rights decisions, delivered in 
December 2015, Case T-273/13, Sarafraz v. Council, EU:T:2015:939 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.) and 
Case T-274/13, Emadi v. Council, EU:T:2015:938 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
 94. The EU counterterrorism sanctions regime is different from third-State regimes like the Iran 
and Syria sanctions regimes because it typically requires a designation by a competent national authority 
or the U.N. Security Council prior to a listing at the EU level. See, e.g., Hamas, supra note 80. The 
Council’s policy discretion over counterterrorism designations is therefore significantly more constrained 
by the decisions of national authorities compared to its discretion over third-State regimes. However, ISIL 
and al-Qaeda are relatively recent exceptions to this policy. In September 2016, the European Union 
introduced new measures that allow the Council to designate individuals with ties to those groups without 
having to rely on a previous designation by a competent authority. See Maya Lester, EU Introduces EU 
Autonomous ISIL/al-Qaeda Sanctions, EU SANCTIONS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2016), https://europeansanctions.
com/2016/09/20/eu-introduces-eu-autonomous-isilal-qaida-sanctions. Due to the differences in the legal 
authorities of the Council and the subject matter between the terrorism regime and third-State sanctions, 
terrorism-related cases were excluded from the dataset. Similarly, the EU’s Iran human rights sanctions, 
first imposed in 2011, are governed by a different set of Council decisions and regulations than the nuclear 
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Finally, due to the implementation of the JCPOA, most of the EU Iran 
nuclear sanctions were lifted in January 2016. Nevertheless, between January 
2016 and early 2017, the EU courts continued to issue decisions on—and strike 
down—Iran nuclear and proliferation-related sanctions imposed prior to the 
entry into force of the JCPOA. They have applied the same due process doctrine 
in those cases as they did before the signing of the agreement.95 While the 
continued consideration of essentially moot cases might seem puzzling, the EU 
courts have consistently held that designated persons and entities have an interest 
in a ruling on the legality of their designation, even if they are no longer subject 
to sanctions.96 The implementation of the JCPOA therefore did not seem to affect 
the reasoning of the courts, at least not overtly. It did, however, affect the data 
on relisting in the cases decided after the July 2015 signing of the JCPOA. The 
relisting option in most of those cases was rendered moot because the sanctions 
in question were either lifted or about to be lifted when the courts issued their 
decisions.97 This was accounted for in the data.  
B. Data 
The study collected two types of data: information about key parameters of 
the judicial decisions in the dataset and information about policymakers’ 
responses to these decisions. For each judicial decision, the study recorded the 
bottom-line result, by applicant (dismissed/struck down/partially struck down); 
whether the decision was appealed to the CJEU, distinguishing between appeals 
filed by the Council and appeals filed by the applicants;98 and whether the text 
of the decision indicates that the Council relied on confidential material, to assess 
the extent to which classification issues played a role in the Council’s decision 
making. 
On the policy side, the study traced the Council’s response to decisions 
striking down sanctions at two levels: the particular sanction reviewed in each 
case and the general listing criteria in the Iran and Syria sanctions regime. First, 
 
and proliferation-related sanctions. See EU Restrictive Measures against Iran, EUROPEAN COUNCIL & 
COUNCIL OF THE EU, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran (last visited Nov. 10, 
2018). Therefore, the two Iran human rights cases decided to date, supra note 93, were also excluded from 
the dataset. 
 95. See e.g., IRISL II, supra note 56; Case T-436/14, Neka Novin Co., Private Joint Stock v. 
Council, EU:T:2017:142 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-418/14, Sina Bank v. Council, EU:T:2016:619 
(First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Joined Cases T-423/13 & T-64/14, Good Luck Shipping LLC v. Council, 
EU:T:2016:308 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.); Bank Saderat Iran, supra note 52; Bank Mellat, supra note 
52; Case T-539/14, North Drilling v. Council, EU:T:2015:871 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-
161/13, First Islamic Investment Bank v. Council, EU:T:2015:667 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-
45/14, HTTS and Bateni v. Council, EU:T:2015:650 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-121/13, Oil 
Pension Fund Investment Co. v. Council, EU:T:2015:645 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-5/13, Iran 
Liquified Natural Gas Co. v. Council, EU:T:2015:644 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-158/13, Iran 
Aluminum Co. (Iralco) v. Council, EU:T:2015:634 (Second Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
 96. See, e.g., Sedghi, supra note 67, ¶¶ 33-42. 
 97. See Council Implementing Regulation 2015/1863, supra note 42 (EU Implementation Day 
delisting catalogue); cf. S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 40, JCPOA Annex II, Attachment 1 (listing persons 
and entities slated for delisting by the EU and annexing it to the JCPOA). 
 98. Note that if the CJEU overruled the GC on appeal, the case result data reflect the final 
outcome of the proceedings for each case, post-appeal. The CJEU overruled the GC in only one case in 
the dataset. See Kala Naft, supra note 52. 
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the study examined what happened to the sanctions the courts had struck down 
in the aftermath of judicial intervention. For every sanction struck down, it 
recorded whether the Council relisted or maintained the listing of the person or 
entity in question. In addition, the study collected all the statements of reasons 
the Council provided for the sanctions challenged in the cases in the dataset and 
compared them with the amended reasons it used to relist or maintain the listing 
of persons and entities that had their sanctions annulled by the courts. The 
information about delisting and relisting and the statements of reasons were 
obtained from EU Council decisions and regulations published regularly in the 
EU Official Journal.99 The data from EU decisions and regulations was 
supplemented with publicly available information, such as blogs that track EU 
sanctions.100 
Importantly, the Council decisions and regulations often clearly stated that 
a certain person or entity was being removed from the sanctions list or relisted 
with a new statement of reasons pursuant to a GC or CJEU decision (on appeal). 
It was therefore fairly simple to establish causality between court decisions and 
subsequent Council policy decisions. 
At the broader level, the study traced the changes made by the Council to 
the listing criteria in both the Iran and Syria sanctions regimes in order to assess 
the impact of judicial review on policy beyond particular designations. 
IV. FINDINGS 
A. Case Results 
Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom about judicial deference in 
foreign affairs, the EU courts struck down sanctions in 126 of the 204 individual 
 
 99. Regarding Iran, see Council Implementing Regulation 2017/77 of Jan. 16, 2017, 2017 O.J. 
(L 12) 24 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 2016/603 of Apr. 18, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 104) 8 (EU) 
[hereinafter Council Implementing Regulation 2016/603]; Council Implementing Regulation 2015/2204 
of Nov. 30, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 314) 10 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 2015/1863, supra note 
42; Council Implementing Regulation 2015/549 of Apr. 7, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 92) 12 (EU); Council 
Implementing Regulation 2015/230 of Feb. 12, 2015, 2015 O.J (L 39) 3 (EU); Council Implementing 
Regulation 1202/2014 of Nov. 7, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 325) 3 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 
397/2014 of Apr. 16, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 1361/2013 of 
Dec. 17, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 343) 7 (EU) [hereinafter Council Implementing Regulation 1361/2013]; 
Council Implementing Regulation 1203/2013 of Nov. 26 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 316) 1 (EU) [hereinafter 
Council Implementing Regulation 1203/2013]; Council Implementing Regulation 1154/2013 of Nov. 15 
2013, 2013 O.J. (L 306) 3 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 1264/2012 of Dec. 21 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(L 356) 55 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 709/2012 of Aug. 2, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 208) 2 (EU); 
Council Regulation 267/2012, supra note 86. 
 Regarding Syria, see Council Implementing Regulation 2016/1996 of Nov. 15, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 
308) 3 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 2016/840 of May 27, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 141) 30 (EU); 
Council Implementing Regulation 2015/828 of May 28, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 132) 3 (EU); Council 
Implementing Regulation 2015/108 of Jan. 26, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 20) 2 (EU); Council Implementing 
Regulation 1105/2014 of Oct. 20, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 301) 7 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 
1013/2014 of Sept. 26, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 283) 9 (EU); Council Implementing Regulation 578/2014 of 
May 28, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 160) 11 (EU). 
 100. The “European Sanctions” blog, by Maya Lester and Michael O’Kane, was a particularly 
valuable source of information. Lester represented applicants before the GC and CJEU in many targeted 
sanctions cases. See Maya Lester & Michael O’Kane, EUR. SANCTIONS, https://europeansanctions.com 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
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cases in the dataset, or sixty-two percent of all reviewed sanctions. In an 
additional four cases (two percent of the cases in the dataset), the courts struck 
down the original measures designating the applicant but upheld later measures 
maintaining that applicant on the sanctions list.101 In other words, sanctions were 
struck down in whole or in part in sixty-four percent of the cases in the dataset. 
Challenges to sanctions were dismissed in full in only thirty-six percent of the 
cases. Table 2 summarizes the case results, and Figure 1 describes the 
distribution of the decisions throughout the research period. 
 
Table 2 – Case Results 
 
 Iran Syria Total 
Sanction 
struck down 112 (63%) 14 (50%) 126 (62%) 
Challenge 
dismissed 61 (35%) 13 (46%) 74 (36%) 
Partially 
struck down 3 (2%) 1 (4%) 4 (2%) 
 176 (100%) 28 (100%) 204 (100%) 
 
 
 101. Case T-579/11, Akhras v. Council, EU:T:2015:97 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-
434/11, Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v. Council, EU:T:2013:405 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case 
T-495/10, Bank Saderat PLC v. Council, EU:T:2013:142 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); First Islamic 
Investment Bank, supra note 95. 
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Figure 1 – Case Results by Year 
 
Importantly, the percentage of sanctions struck down is significantly higher  
if we only consider the first round of litigation for each applicant, excluding 
second and third challenges. Second and third challenges are defined here as 
challenges brought by an applicant that had previously challenged their 
designation and received a judgment on the merits. The dataset contains thirty-
three second challenges and two third challenges (out of a total 204 individual 
GC decisions).102 Additional repeat challenges were not included in the dataset 
 
 102. For Iran second and third challenges, see Bank Tejarat, supra note 79; IRISL II, supra note 
56 (IRISL and ten other companies); Case T-65/14, Bank Refah Kargaran v. Council, EU:T:2016:692 
(First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Export Development Bank of Iran, supra note 79; Sina Bank, supra note 95 
(third Sina Bank challenge); National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), supra note 79; Case T-63/14, 
Iran Insurance Company v. Council, EU:T:2016:264 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-68/14, Post Bank 
Iran v. Council, EU:T:2016:263 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Good Luck Shipping, supra note 95; Case T-
52/15, Sharif University of Technology v. Council, EU:T:2016:254 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); North 
Drilling, supra note 95; HTTS, supra note 95 (third challenge for applicant HTTS, second challenge for 
applicant Bateni); Case T-95/14, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Co. v. Council, 
EU:T:2015:433 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-563/12, Central Bank of Iran v. Council, 
EU:T:2015:187 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Sina Bank, supra note 56; Joined Cases T-35/10 & T-7/11, Bank 
Melli Iran v. Council, EU:T:2013:397 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-128/12, HTTS v. Council, 
EU:T:2013:312 (Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-492/10, Melli Bank PLC v. Council, EU:T:2013:80 
(Fourth Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
 For Syria second challenges, see Case T-153/15, Hamcho v. Council, EU:T:2016:630 (Seventh 
Chamber) (E.C.J.) (applicants Mohamad Hamcho and Hamcho International); Case T-154/15, Jaber v. 
Council, EU:T:2016:629 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-155/15, Kaddour v. Council, 
EU:T:2016:628 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-790/14, Hassan v. Council, EU:T:2016:429 (Seventh 
Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-443/13, Makhlouf v. Council, EU:T:2016:27 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
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because they were still pending at the time of writing.103 The results of second 
and third challenges will be further discussed in Section IV.D. Looking only at 
the first round of litigation for each applicant, the courts struck down sanctions 
in whole or in part in seventy-three percent of the cases, fully dismissing only 
twenty-seven percent of the challenges. 
 
Table 3 – Case Results Excluding Second/Third Challenges 
 
 Iran Syria Total 
Sanction 
struck down 105 (71%) 14 (64%) 119 (71%) 
Challenge 
dismissed 39 (27%) 7 (32%) 46 (27%) 
Partially 
struck down 3 (2%) 1 (4%) 4 (2%) 
 147 (100%) 22 (100%) 169 (100%) 
 
Before proceeding, a note is in order regarding the Council’s reliance on 
classified material in making the designations included in the dataset. The 
designations reviewed in the dataset cases were based on proposals from member 
States, sometimes relying on classified material that those member States were 
unwilling to share with the applicant or the courts (and perhaps not even with 
other EU member States). An indication that the Council relied on confidential 
material or encountered probative challenges related to such material was found 
in forty-seven (twenty-seven percent) of the Iran cases and in one of the Syria 
cases—about twenty-four percent of all the individual cases in the dataset.  
B. Appeals 
Turning to appeals, the findings indicate that the Council rarely appealed 
GC decisions striking down sanctions. Of a total of 126 sanctions struck down, 
the Council filed only five appeals (four percent)—all in Iran cases.104 The 
Council’s last appeal was filed in April 2013, although the GC has decided many 
cases since then.105 This suggests that, in the cases in which it decided to relist 
 
 103. See, e.g., Case T-332/15, Ocean Capital Administration v. Council, action brought June 16, 
2015, 2015 O.J. (C 294) 76-77 (EU) (thirty-two applicants, case pending). Two Syria cases that were 
pending at the time of writing, and therefore not included in the dataset, were recently decided. In both 
cases the GC upheld the relisting of the individuals in question. See Case T-408/16, HX v. Council, 
EU:T:2018:355 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-461/16, Kaddour v. Council, EU:T:2018:316 (Fifth 
Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
 104. See Fulmen, supra note 52 (concerning two applicants: Fulmen and its manager); Kala Naft, 
supra note 52; Bank Mellat, supra note 52; Bank Saderat, supra note 52. Note that the Council sometimes 
filed cross-appeals in response to appeals brought by the applicants. Here I consider only the appeals the 
Council itself had initiated. 
 105. The last Iran appeal filed by the Council was Bank Saderat, supra note 52, decided on April 
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or maintain the listing of persons and entities that prevailed in court, the Council 
preferred taking relatively swift unilateral action over exhausting its options 
through the judicial process. Moreover, the CJEU dismissed all but one of the 
Council’s appeals. In Council v. Kala Naft, the CJEU set aside a GC decision to 
strike down sanctions against an Iranian company for trading in oil and gas 
equipment that could be used for Iran’s nuclear program.106   
C. Relisting 
The success rate of individuals who challenged their designation under the 
Iran and Syria sanctions regimes is impressive—seventy-three percent in first 
challenges and sixty-four percent overall. But their victories were often short-
lived. As we have seen, the Council was free to relist persons and entities that 
had successfully challenged their designation, because the courts struck down 
sanctions only on due process grounds. The Council could reimpose the 
sanctions after addressing the procedural flaws the courts had identified. In many 
cases, it did just that. 
The Council relisted persons and entities that had their sanctions annulled 
by the courts in fifty-seven percent of the cases. The relisting included sixty-
seven relistings of Iranian entities and individuals and five relistings of Syrian 
entities and individuals, out of a total of 126 individual sanctions that were struck 
down by the EU courts. An additional five percent of the designated persons and 
entities that had won in court—four Iranian entities and two Syrian persons—
were maintained on the lists by measures the Council adopted during the judicial 
proceedings, which fell outside the scope of the judgments. Therefore, persons 
and entities that won in court were either relisted or kept on the sanctions lists in 
sixty-two percent of the cases. 
At the same time, the Council did not relist applicants that won in court in 
thirty-two percent of the 126 cases in which sanctions were struck down, 
representing thirty-three Iran cases and seven Syria cases. Note that these 
numbers probably underestimate the number of individual sanctions eliminated 
in the shadow of judicial review. The cases resolved without a judgment on the 
merits of an application for annulment—which were not included in the 
dataset—highlight this possibility. In a number of those cases, the Council 
removed designated persons and entities from the sanctions list during the 
judicial proceedings, before a judgment on the merits could be issued.107 
The remaining six percent of the cases, representing eight Iranian persons 
and entities, are cases decided after July 2015 pertaining to persons and entities 
covered by the JCPOA. As previously mentioned, the relisting option in those 
cases became irrelevant in light of the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015 and its 
 
21, 2016. Bank Saderat was among the entities that were to remain subject to EU sanctions after JCPOA 
Implementation Day. Although the CJEU upheld the GC’s judgment striking down the Bank’s 
designation, the Council amended the statement of reasons for the Bank shortly before the judgment was 
delivered and it remained listed until October 2016. See Council Implementing Regulation 2016/603, 
supra note 99. 
 106. See Kala Naft, supra note 52. 
 107. See, e.g., Ghreiwati, supra note 92; Assad, supra note 92. 
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subsequent implementation in January 2016. Since the sanctions in question 
were either lifted or about to be lifted when the courts decided those cases, a 
concrete decision on relisting in response to the judicial decisions was arguably 
no longer necessary. Those cases are therefore categorized as inconclusive in 
Table 4, which summarizes the data regarding relisting. 
 
Table 4 – Relisting 
 
 Iran Syria Total 
Total struck down 112 (100%) 14 (100%) 126 (100%) 
Relisted 67 (60%) 5 (36%) 72 (57%) 
Maintained 4 (4%) 2 (14%) 6 (5%) 
Not relisted 33 (29%) 7 (50%) 40 (32%) 
Inconclusive 8 (7%) 0 (0%) 8 (6%) 
 
In addition to the data about the number of relistings, the study compared 
the amended statements of reasons the Council provided in relisting measures to 
the original statements of reasons that supported the sanctions that the courts 
annulled.108 For the most part, the amended statements of reasons added little or 
no information about the specific “sanctionable” behavior in which the 
designated person or entity had engaged. In many cases, the Council simply 
amended the listing criteria or provided reasons based on different criteria than 
those it had originally relied on. This practice is discussed in greater depth in 
Section IV.E. 
D. Second and Third Challenges 
As previously mentioned, the dataset contains thirty-five repeat-challenges 
by applicants who previously challenged their designation and received a 
decision on the merits—thirty-three second challenges and two third challenges. 
Additional repeat challenges were still pending at the time of writing.109 In three 
of those thirty-five cases, the courts dismissed both the first and the second 
challenge. In thirty-two cases, persons and entities that won in the first round of 
litigation challenged the Council’s decision to relist or maintain them on the 
sanctions lists. Of those thirty-two cases, five involved an applicant winning a 
 
 108. For the full text of all the statements of reasons, original and amended, see the data file, 
supra note 52. 
 109. See supra note 103 (citing cases). 
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second challenge. In two cases, applicants won a third challenge. In the 
remaining twenty-five cases, however, the courts dismissed second challenges. 
Annex II to this Article summarizes the results of the repeat challenges.110 
E. Expanding Listing Criteria 
The findings presented thus far relate to the Council’s particular decisions 
concerning each individual sanction that the EU courts struck down. But the 
Council’s response to the judicial decisions during the research period was not 
limited to particular individual sanctions. The Council also amended the listing 
criteria in both the Iran and Syria sanctions regimes. Annex I to this Article 
documents these amendments. 
In the case of Iran, the criteria for imposing autonomous individual EU 
sanctions initially required a direct link to nuclear or missile proliferation. That 
standard was difficult for the Council to satisfy.111 The Council often argued in 
court that it could not provide concrete evidence to support listings based on 
involvement in proliferation because of the “clandestine nature of nuclear 
proliferation activities.” The Council’s inability to present evidence often 
resulted in the courts striking down the challenged sanctions.112 
The Council expanded the listing criteria under the Iran sanctions regime 
several times since the adoption of the first nuclear sanctions measures in 
2007.113 In addition to persons and entities involved in nuclear or missile 
proliferation, the amended criteria targeted those who violated the Iran sanctions 
or assisted others in doing so; members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps; entities owned or controlled by IRISL; entities acting on its behalf or 
providing it services; and other related persons and entities. Arguably the most 
significant expansion occurred in early 2012, when the Council added the 
criterion of providing “support, such as material, logistical or financial support, 
to the Government of Iran.”114 
The Council expanded the listing criteria for persons and entities under the 
Syria sanctions regime as well. The original EU Syria sanctions measures 
concerning the violent repression of civilians by the Assad regime, adopted in 
May 2011, targeted “persons responsible for the violent repression against the 
civilian population in Syria.”115 Later on, the Council added “persons and entities 
benefiting from or supporting the regime” and their associates. In October 2015, 
the Council expanded the criteria once again, this time specifying more precisely 
which categories of persons and entities should be listed. The current criteria 
 
 110. This table is also available digitally at https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil
/vol44/iss1/1/. 
 111. See HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING, supra note 55, ¶ 23 (noting that EU courts were 
comfortable with broader listing criteria, such as “providing support to the Government of Iran,” than with 
specific criteria involving nuclear proliferation, which is more difficult to prove). 
 112. See section II.B; see also, e.g., IRISL, supra note 75, ¶ 63; Sharif University of Technology, 
supra note 71, ¶¶ 54, 63-75; Iran Insurance, supra note 71, ¶ 126; Fulmen, supra note 71, ¶ 101. 
 113. See infra Annex I. 
 114. Council Regulation 267/2012, supra note 86, art. 23(2)(d); see also Council Decision 
2012/35/CFSP, supra note 39, recital 13 and arts. 1(6), 1(7). 
 115. See infra Annex I. 
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include prominent businesspeople operating in Syria, members of the Assad or 
Makhlouf families, government ministers, senior military officials, intelligence 
officials, and those involved in chemical weapons proliferation.116 
Were these amendments to the listing criteria in both the EU Iran and Syria 
sanctions regimes a result of judicial intervention? While the Council’s particular 
relisting decisions discussed above were often explicitly tied to specific judicial 
decision, measures amending listing criteria did not specifically state whether 
the amendments were being made in response to judicial intervention. The text 
of the amending measures, standing alone, therefore does not fully reveal the 
purpose of the amendments. It appears, however, that the Council’s motivation 
in making the amendments was a combination of a policy interest in applying 
more pressure on Iran and Syria in light of various developments and a secondary 
interest in reducing the likelihood of further judicial annulments of sanctions. 
The policy reasons for the criteria expansions have been explained in the 
amending measures. For instance, when the Council decided to add the “support 
to the Government of Iran” criterion to the Iran measures, it reiterated “its serious 
and deepening concerns over the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” and 
explained that it was going to introduce additional sanctions to “severely [affect] 
the Iranian financial system, in the transport sector, in the energy sector, [and to 
take] measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well 
as in other areas.”117 The listing criteria expansion was part of a broader 
escalation in EU sanctions against Iran, beginning with the adoption of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1929 in 2010.118 Similarly, when the EU Council 
amended the Syria listing criteria in 2015, it explained why targeting the 
categories of persons and entities introduced in the amendment was necessary to 
prevent the Syrian regime from circumventing sanctions and to weaken its power 
centers.119 
At the same time, expanding listing criteria also reduces the risk of judicial 
intervention in sanctions, because the broader the listing criteria, the easier it 
should be for the Council to satisfy due process requirements concerning reasons 
and evidence.120 The GC alluded to this in noting that the Council is free to 
amend listing criteria if it has trouble lawfully listing a person or an entity that 
should be subject to sanctions under the existing ones.121 In some cases, a direct 
link can be drawn between judicial decisions, criteria amendments, and 
subsequent relistings. 
The IRISL case, discussed in Section II.B, is a telling example. The GC 
struck down the designation of IRISL and a number of its subsidiaries in 
September 2013 on grounds of error of assessment of the evidence. The GC 
 
 116. See Council Decision 2015/1836/CFSP of Oct. 12, 2015, 2015 O.J. (L 266) 75 (EU) 
[hereinafter Council Decision 2015/1836/CFSP]; Council Regulation No. 2015/1828 of Oct. 12, 2015, 
2015 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EU). 
 117. See Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, supra note 39, recitals 5, 13. 
 118. See supra Section I.C. 
 119. See Council Decision 2015/1836/CFSP, supra note 116, pmbl. 
 120. See HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING, supra note 55, at 29 (Michael Bishop, Senior Legal 
Advisor, EU Council Legal Service, Council of the European Union). 
 121. See supra note 81. 
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found that the fact that IRISL violated Security Council resolutions by 
transporting military equipment does not prove that it had engaged in nuclear 
proliferation, as required by the criterion based on which it was designated. 
Almost immediately thereafter, in October 2013, the Council amended the listing 
criteria under the Iran sanctions regime, extending the criteria to persons and 
entities that have themselves violated Security Council resolutions and EU 
decisions concerning Iran.122 In November 2013, the Council relisted IRISL and 
its subsidiaries with new statements of reasons based on the sanctions violation 
criterion.123 IRISL was now listed for being “involved in the shipment of arms-
related materiel [sic] from Iran in violation [of UNSCR 1747]. Three clear 
violations were reported to the U.N. Security Council Iran Sanctions Committee 
in 2009.”124 As the reader may recall, the Council relied on the same three 
violations as evidence in its unsuccessful defense of the previous listing of IRISL 
and the others under the earlier version of the listing criteria. This suggests that 
it expanded the designation criteria, at least in part, in order to avoid having to 
produce new evidence to support the designation of IRISL. This strategy worked: 
in February 2017, the GC dismissed a second IRISL challenge to its relisting 
based on the new criterion.125 
In a number of other cases, the Council relisted persons and entities based 
on the broad criterion of “providing support to the Government of Iran,” after 
the courts struck down their designation based on more specific criteria such as 
involvement in nuclear proliferation or circumventing sanctions. The courts 
largely upheld designations based on this criterion, indicating that to the extent 
the Council was trying to make sanctions more immune to judicial review by 
relying on broad criteria, it has successfully done so.126 
 
 122. See Council Decision 2013/497/CFSP of Oct. 10, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 272) 46 (EU); Council 
Regulation 971/2013 of Oct. 10, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 272) 1 (EU). 
 123. See Council Decision 2013/685/CFSP of Nov. 26, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 316) 46 (EU); Council 
Implementing Regulation 1203/2013, supra note 99. 
 124. Council Decision 2013/685/CFSP, supra note 123, at 47. The other companies were listed 
as entities owned or controlled by IRISL. 
 125. IRISL II, supra note 56. 
 126. It is important to note that while the CJEU upheld the criterion of “providing support to the 
government of Iran,” Case C-266/15 interpreted it as covering only activity “which, regardless of any 
direct or indirect link established with nuclear proliferation, is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative 
significance, of encouraging that proliferation.” Case T-563/12 (Central Bank of Iran), supra note 102, 
¶ 66 (upholding the designation), appeal dismissed Case C-266/15, supra note 69); see also Case T-
578/12, National Iranian Oil Company v. Council, EU:T:2014:678, ¶¶ 119-120 (Seventh Chamber) 
(E.C.J.) (upholding the designation), appeal dismissed Case C-440/14 P, National Iranian Oil Company 
v. Council, EU:C:2016:128 (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J.); Sharif University of Technology, supra note 102 
(upholding the designation), appeal dismissed Case C-385/16 P Sharif University of Technology v. 
Council, EU:C:2017:258)). This interpretation notwithstanding, the courts have largely upheld sanctions 
based on this criterion. See Bank Tajerat, supra note 79; Export Development Bank of Iran, supra note 
79; National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), supra note 79; Case T-435/14 Tose’e Ta’avon Bank v. 
Council, EU:T:2016:531 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case C-459/15 P Iranian Offshore Engineering & 
Construction v. Council, EU:C:2016:646 (Ninth Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-9/13 National Iranian Gas 
Company v. Council, EU:T:2015:236 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Case T-10/13 Bank of Industry & Mine 
v. Council, EU:T:2015:235 (First Chamber) (E.C.J.); Iran Insurance Company, supra note 102; Post Bank 
Iran, supra note 102; Bank Refah Kargaran, supra note 102. But see Sina Bank, supra note 95; Oil 
Pension Fund Investment Co., supra note 95; North Drilling, supra note 95 (striking down listings based 
on the criterion of support to the government of Iran); National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), supra 
note 80. 
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Similar to the Iran criteria amendments, the Council’s measures 
introducing the new Syria listing criteria did not explicitly tie the changes to 
judicial decisions. But the new criteria codified grounds for designation that the 
Council had relied upon under the previous criteria. Even before the new criteria 
were introduced, the Council listed Syrian individuals for being prominent 
businesspeople in Syria or belonging to the Assad family, and the courts have 
upheld listings on those grounds in a number of cases.127 It is possible that the 
Council sought to clarify the Syria listing criteria to further immunize future 
listings from judicial intervention. 
There is some evidence that this strategy worked in the Syria context just 
as it did in the Iran nuclear context. For example, the reasons for the designation 
of Syrian businessman HX were amended in May 2016, after the introduction of 
new criteria specifying prominent businesspeople in Syria in October 2015. The 
reasons were amended shortly before the June 2016 GC judgment striking down 
HX’s original designation for lack of evidence. HX therefore remained listed 
based on the new reasons notwithstanding the judgment. HX subsequently lost 
his second challenge against his relisting based on the new reasons. The Court 
held that under the 2015 criteria, being a prominent businessman in Syria merits 
designation without any further reasons or evidence.128 This again suggests that 
relisting based on new criteria did help the Council avoid judicial invalidation of 
sanctions it previously failed to defend. 
These substantive changes in the structure of the Iran and Syria sanctions 
regimes during the research period should be considered in the context of 
previous reforms induced by judicial review in early sanctions cases decided 
prior to the research period (described in Section II.C of this Article). Early 
judicial review of individual EU sanctions encouraged the EU Council to put in 
place systemic procedural safeguards in the designation process. 
F. Summary 
The main findings of the empirical study can be summarized as follows. 
The rate of individual EU Iran and Syria sanctions that the EU courts struck 
down in whole or in part on due process grounds was very high (seventy-three 
percent in first challenges and sixty-four percent overall). The results of second 
and third challenges, however, are more positive from the point of view of the 
Council; it successfully defended the vast majority of the sanctions (twenty-five 
out of thirty-two sanctions) that the courts had previously struck down. 
Policymakers pushed back in response to the judicial decisions by relisting many 
of the persons and entities that won in court. Sixty-two percent of the persons 
 
 127. See Maya Lester, EU Expands Criteria for Including People in Syria Sanctions, EUROPEAN 
SANCTIONS BLOG (Oct. 16, 2015), https://europeansanctions.com/2015/10/16/eu-expands-criteria-for-
including-people-in-syria-sanctions/. 
 128. See Case T-723/14 HX v. Council, EU:T:2016:332 (Fifth Chamber) (E.C.J.); HX, supra 
note 103. Similarly, the reasons for the listing of Syrian applicant Haswani were amended pursuant to the 
new criteria, before the GC judgment striking down his original designations was issued. Here, too, the 
judgment did not cover the new measures and Haswani remained listed. In light of the amended reasons 
and the different criteria, it is plausible that the new designation would fare better in the next round of 
litigation. See Case T-231/15 Haswani v. Council, EU:T:2017 (Seventh Chamber) (E.C.J.). 
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and entities whose designation the courts struck down remained listed in the 
aftermath of judicial intervention. At the same time, the Council did not reimpose 
thirty-two percent of the annulled sanctions, and more sanctions were probably 
eliminated in the shadow of judicial review. Finally, the Council expanded listing 
criteria in both the Iran and Syria sanctions regimes, at least in part to reduce the 
risk of further judicial intervention. 
V. PROCEDURAL REVIEW IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The EU courts applied a due process model in reviewing targeted 
sanctions. They focused on the Council’s compliance with procedure while 
giving it practically absolute deference with regard to the substance of its 
sanctions policy. It therefore may be helpful to assess the findings about the 
impact of judicial review on policy in the CJEU case study against familiar 
theoretical claims about procedural judicial review of legislative and 
administrative action. The goal here is not to provide a comprehensive account 
of process-oriented theories of judicial review or to answer the deeply contested 
normative question of what the judicial role in foreign affairs ought to be. Rather, 
the more modest aim here is to explore what the CJEU case study may teach us 
about how the procedural model of judicial review works in practice in the areas 
of foreign affairs and national security. 
A. Procedural Judicial Review 
Procedural theories of judicial review of legislative or administrative action 
direct courts to focus on the process that produced a particular substantive 
outcome instead of the outcome itself. 129 They suggest that by rigorously 
 
 129. Perhaps the most influential theories of procedural judicial review were famously articulated 
by Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely in the U.S. constitutional context. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 
175 (describing how courts “can avoid constitutional adjudication without causing hardship to litigants, 
by resort to special rules of procedure or to techniques of statutory construction, or both”); JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-74, 87-88 (1980) (advocating “a 
participation-oriented representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review”); see also WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 336-342 (1988) (describing various legal process theories); Ittai Bar-Siman-
Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1958-
1962 (2011) (critiquing the resistance to judicial review of the legislative process); Dan T. Coenen, A 
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch 
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1587 (2001) (describing nine types of structural rules that 
“[facilitate] a judicial ‘remand’ of a challenged program for reevaluation by nonjudicial government 
employees”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by 
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1283 (2005) (outlining “conditions under which 
judicial review can facilitate the operation of our pluralist democracy by lowering the stakes of politics”) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Pluralism]; Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 200 
(1976) (examining the meaning of due process in lawmaking in the context of judicial review); Patricia 
Popelier, Preliminary Comments on the Role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs, 6 LEGISPRUDENCE 257 
(2012) (considering process-oriented review in the context of judicial oversight of regulatory reform); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 922-923, 940-946 
(1989) (reviewing ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY supra); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 
4 (2008) (arguing that courts should “raise the costs to government decisionmakers of enacting 
constitutionally problematic policies rather than attempting to designate certain government actions . . . 
as impermissible”); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 269, 269 
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enforcing procedural requirements, courts can compel policymakers to take a 
second look at their decisions and consider them more carefully, without 
prejudging policy outcomes or substituting policymakers’ judgment with their 
own.130 In this manner, procedural review facilitates dialogue and collaboration 
between courts and policymakers, through which courts indirectly help improve 
substantive decisions.131 In Alexander Bickel’s words, procedural review is one 
of the techniques for “eliciting answers, since so often they engage the Court in 
a Socratic colloquy with the other institutions of government and with society as 
a whole concerning the necessity for this or that measure . . . .”132 
In addition to motivating policymakers to correct substantive errors ex 
post, judicially-imposed procedures also encourage greater diligence in 
policymaking and implementation ex ante. They affect policymaking beyond the 
particular measures under judicial review. Stringent procedural requirements, the 
argument goes, screen out certain policies and measures that infringe on legally-
protected values, because they raise the enactment costs of such policies or 
measures. Heightened enactment costs incentivize policymakers to abandon 
certain measures if they find that their benefits from a policy standpoint do not 
justify the additional enactment costs. At the same time, procedural review 
preserves policymakers’ ability to act when they find that the benefits of certain 
policies and measures are worth the extra effort.133 
The main advantage highlighted by supporters of procedural judicial 
review is that it offers a way for courts to discipline policymakers without 
 
(1975) (arguing for “structural due process” as a category of constitutional limitation that focuses “on the 
structures through which policies are both formed and applied, and formed in the very process of being 
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David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1819, 1826-29 (2016). For discussion of procedural judicial review in the European Union that draws on 
American theories of procedural judicial review, see Lenaerts, supra note 57. 
 130. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 129, at 32 (“The conventional justification for 
constitutionally or judicially imposed procedural requirements is that they increase accuracy by correcting 
mistakes ex post and by encouraging government decisionmakers to be more thoughtful and careful ex 
ante.”); Lenaerts, supra note 57, at 15-16 (“‘Process review’ increases judicial scrutiny over the decision-
making process of the EU institutions. However, it prevents the [CJEU] from intruding into the realm of 
politics . . . . Whilst ‘process review’ shows due deference to the expertise and higher institutional 
capacities of policymakers, it may be the only way of judicially enforcing principles that have a clear 
political nature . . . .”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 
455 (2012) (describing a version of procedural judicial review that focuses on the identity of the decision-
maker as allowing “expression of judicial skepticism without the strong medicine of irredeemable 
invalidation”). 
 131. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 341-42; Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 129, at 
1954-58; Coenen, supra note 129, at 1582-83, 1868-69; Lenaerts, supra note 57, at 4. 
 132. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 70-71. 
 133. See Stephenson, supra note 129, at 25 (“[C]ourts can improve the constitutional 
performance of government policymaking institutions by conditioning judicial approval of certain 
constitutionally problematic policies on the government’s willingness to undertake activities that raise the 
costs of enacting those policies. Doing so screens out government actions with benefits that are low 
relative to their constitutional and other social costs, while allowing the government to take action with 
relatively high social benefits.”). Compare this to the argument that even sporadic and limited judicial 
consideration of national security cases creates an “observer effect” that screens out national security 
policies the executive predicts are unlikely to survive judicial review. This “observer effect” has an impact 
on policy beyond the particular issue the courts have considered. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: 
National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
827 (2013). 
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delving into politically or morally controversial issues, circumventing problems 
of institutional competence and democratic legitimacy. Moreover, as John Hart 
Ely once observed, procedural review “involves tasks that courts, as experts on 
process and (more important) as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be 
better qualified and situated to perform than political officials.”134 Procedural 
judicial review gives policymakers leeway to choose their preferred course of 
action as long as they comply with procedural requirements.135 In other words, 
the procedural approach promises “depoliticization through proceduralism.”136 
Procedural review therefore seems particularly appealing in the foreign affairs 
and national security context, in which the political stakes and the cost of judicial 
error are often high, and the institutional competence of courts is more limited 
than usual due to secrecy and information issues.137 
Critics of procedural legal theories have been skeptical about their attempt 
to segregate law from politics, and procedure from substance. Procedural judicial 
review, they have argued, necessarily relies on substantive assumptions about 
what process is due and what values and goals that process aims to promote, be 
it individual rights (as in the CJEU case), epistemic correctness, democratic 
representation, or public welfare.138 
 
 134. See ELY, supra note 129, at 88. But see Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2016) (challenging the view that courts have an advantage over policymakers 
regarding procedural issues). 
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ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 342. 
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procedural requirements such as congressional authorization and hearing rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear 
Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2006). See also 
Huq, supra note 130, at 455; Stephenson, supra note 129, at 19-22 (suggesting that resort to a judicial 
technique that would raise enactment costs for constitutionally problematic policies instead of ruling on 
their substantive legality is particularly useful when policymakers have better information about the 
expected outcomes of a certain policy than the reviewing court). 
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Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (“[I]t is not difficult to show that the constitutional theme of 
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impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.”), at 2; Kessler & 
Pozen, supra note 136, at 1828-29 (“Today’s leading public law theories depart from the old legal process 
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Moreover, procedural theories of judicial review rely on empirical 
assumptions that might not be correct. There is no guarantee that simply making 
policymakers think again or raising the costs of enacting a certain measure would 
produce different—much less better—substantive outcomes.139 Policymakers’ 
motivation to stay the course is particularly strong when they deem a certain 
measure important from a policy or political standpoint, even if its substantive 
legality is questionable.140 The chances that they would abandon their original 
policy choice in those cases are low because policymakers have strong incentives 
to make a serious effort to meet procedural requirements. With this in mind, the 
claim that any policy choice policymakers adopt after reviewing a measure on 
“remand” from the courts should receive judicial deference clearly raises some 
difficulties. 
In other words, forcing policymakers to go through the decision-making 
process again or to comply with stringent procedural requirements could prove 
to be no more than a waste of bureaucratic and political resources that does 
nothing to affect substantive policy outcomes. 
The opposite might also be true. Procedural review could in practice 
circumscribe the substantive options available to policymakers, sometimes 
without any serious judicial consideration of their initial position.141 This might 
be because the political circumstances that made the first act of the political 
branches possible have changed, especially if a replacement act would require 
legislation or a collaborative process that depends on political or bureaucratic 
good will. Alternatively, a replacement measure might not be attainable because 
the political branches cannot meet procedural requirements for practical reasons. 
In the foreign affairs and national security context, for example, striking down a 
measure for lack of a factual basis could make it difficult for policymakers to 
replace it, if it means sharing classified material or obtaining information that is 
not in their possession. 
Moreover, if courts correctly predict the outcome of a do-over, they could 
deploy procedural review strategically to achieve the substantive outcome they 
prefer under the radar, eschewing public criticism and accountability. Although 
judicial predictions about the prospects of a measure rejected on procedural 
grounds might not be correct, there is still something for courts to gain from 
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procedural review. It allows them to delay and possibly avoid engagement with 
controversial questions while keeping the option to address them available, if 
and when the case reaches the courts again. Thus understood, procedural review 
is merely a sham—a means to disguise judicial interference with substance.142 
What did procedural judicial review of EU individual sanctions accomplish 
in the CJEU case study, according to the empirical evidence? Was it successful 
in promoting the interests it set out to protect, namely, the individual rights of 
designated persons and entities? Or did it pointlessly burden other EU 
institutions with additional bureaucracy? Did judicial review preclude any policy 
options? The analysis that follows approaches this question from two 
perspectives: a narrow perspective that evaluates the impact of each individual 
judicial decision on the EU Council’s policy choices; and a wider one that 
explores the broader implications of the interaction between EU courts and 
policymakers over time.143 
B. CJEU Procedural Review—The Narrow Perspective 
From a narrow perspective, it would appear at first glance that judicial 
review has been largely ineffective in changing the situation of persons and 
entities designated under the EU Iran and Syria sanctions regimes. In almost two-
thirds of the cases in the dataset in which the EU courts struck sanctions down, 
the persons and entities in question remained subject to sanctions despite judicial 
intervention.144 
To be sure, the Council did not ignore or overtly defy the courts in 
reimposing annulled sanctions. The courts explicitly anticipated and recognized 
the possibility of relisting in their judgments. The Council, on its part, adopted 
new decisions and regulations, provided new statements of reasons, and 
sometimes produced additional evidence for the annulled sanctions that it 
decided to reimpose. In amending listing criteria to make relistings possible, the 
Council acted on the GC’s invitation. On the face of it, the Council’s actions 
were in line with what the courts have required it to do. The courts only took 
issue with the Council’s compliance with due process, not its substantive 
decisions regarding whom to include in the sanctions lists. 
Yet, in many cases, the changes the Council made in relisting measures 
following court decisions appear to be superficial. The Council often relied on 
either broad or tailor-made listing criteria, which are all but immune to judicial 
scrutiny according to CJEU case law, to address gaps in justification and 
evidence that the courts had identified. Expanding the listing criteria made it 
easier for the Council to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the courts 
without providing more specific reasons or new evidence to justify a listing and 
without compromising classified information. The Council often relisted persons 
 
 142. Tushnet, Subconstitutional, supra note 141, at 1872-76. 
 143. For a similar application of “static” and “dynamic” frameworks of analysis see Huq, supra 
note 130, at 452-65. 
 144. A recent report by the U.K. House of Lords European Union Committee expressed concern 
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and entities under different criteria based on the same or very similar facts that 
supported their previously annulled designation. This practice is clearly reflected 
in the comparison between original and new statements of reasons the Council 
provided upon relisting.145 
These findings about the Council’s relisting practices suggest that while 
the Council did go through the motions to comply with the judicial decisions, its 
responses to the decisions did not reflect a serious effort to fix the flaws the 
courts had identified. Thus interpreted, the empirical findings challenge the 
theory that procedural judicial review affected substantive policy outcomes or 
disciplined policymakers by making them more sensitive to individual rights in 
this case. If this account is correct, it also supports the claim that courts cannot 
rein in the political branches in the high-stakes areas of foreign affairs and 
national security. 
However, a deeper look reveals that this skeptical interpretation of the 
empirical findings overlooks important ways in which judicial review did affect 
policy in the case study. It would be wrong to conclude that judicial review had 
no bearing on the EU Council’s substantive policy decisions regarding individual 
sanctions, or its compliance with due process requirements as interpreted by the 
EU courts. 
1. Substantive Policy 
Let us begin with substantive policy. The empirical findings show that the 
Council did not reimpose about one-third of the sanctions the courts struck down. 
Additional sanctions were likely lifted in the shadow of judicial review.146 In 
other words, a substantial number of the sanctions were eliminated in the process 
of judicial review. This fact suggests that, as procedural judicial review theories 
predict, the process of reconsideration precipitated by judicial review led the 
Council to forgo sanctions that it concluded were less important and central than 
others in the general scheme of its Iran and Syria sanctions policies.147 It could 
be that the Council decided not to relist because judicial review made it pay more 
attention to a particular designation that it did not carefully consider when the 
person or entity in question was first included in the sanctions lists. Alternatively, 
the Council may have concluded that a particular sanction was dispensable 
because it was no longer necessary, or because the costs of going through the 
bureaucracy and policy coordination required to produce a new designation,148 
and the prospect of having to defend it in court,149 outweighed its value in light 
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of EU policy goals. The Council’s relisting patterns, according to this 
explanation, were its “revealed preference” as to which sanctions it viewed as 
truly necessary from a policy perspective.150 
This reading of the findings admittedly entails a degree of speculation. The 
observational tools this study employed cannot paint the full picture of the 
Council’s decision-making process in each case. Another way to understand the 
Council’s relisting patterns is that the Council sometimes decided not to relist, 
not because it concluded that the entity in question was not important from a 
policy perspective, but because it could not mobilize its complex decision-
making apparatus to adopt new measures or because it failed to find a way to 
satisfy the courts’ evidentiary requirements without sharing classified material. 
Yet there are reasons to doubt that the option of relisting in those cases was 
blocked by such practical obstacles. 
First, the Council adopts new sanctions instruments relatively often. 
Although mobilizing the entire EU Council policy apparatus is certainly no 
simple task,151 it does not require an extraordinary effort on the part of the 
Council. What is more, the Council’s relisting decisions and regulations 
surveyed for this study at times specifically mentioned persons and entities the 
Council decided not to relist pursuant to an EU court decision, alongside those 
the Council did decide to relist. This suggests that its decisions not to relist were 
deliberate choices rather than bureaucratic omissions. 
Second, only twenty-four percent of the cases in the dataset contained 
indications that the Council encountered classified material issues in connection 
with challenged designations, suggesting that it is possible that problems related 
to confidential evidence are not as widespread as they may appear.152 
Furthermore, the Council relisted persons and entities several times after arguing 
that there were classified material issues in the first round of litigation, relying 
on broader listing criteria that are easier to satisfy without sharing new, sensitive 
evidence.153 This indicates that the Council has managed to find ways around the 
problem of classified evidence. As we have seen, the Council could—and did—
circumvent classification problems by expanding listing criteria. 
So far, we have considered the effects of judicial review on substantive 
policy decisions ex post. It is possible, however, that judicial review also had an 
ex ante effect on sanctions decisions, by encouraging the Council to avoid 
imposing certain individual sanctions in the first place or to unilaterally delist 
persons and entities that have not challenged their designation in court. This 
screening effect, predicted by procedural review theory,154 might occur if the 
Council concludes that a certain designation would not survive judicial scrutiny. 
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This study collected data about sanctions that have been reviewed by the 
EU courts. Therefore, it does not allow for robust conclusions regarding the 
existence or extent of ex ante screening by the Council in the shadow of judicial 
review. Nevertheless, if ex ante screening did occur, it would only reinforce the 
argument that judicial review helped eliminate excessive sanctions without 
really blocking any policy options. Such an effect would mean that judicial 
review in the case study eliminated even more individual sanctions than the data 
reveal. As for policy costs, the analysis concerning the Council’s ability to 
reimpose sanctions it believes are important enough from a policy perspective 
seems to apply equally to ex ante decisions to impose or maintain individual 
sanctions. 
2. Compliance with Due Process in Individual Designations 
In addition to the impact judicial review had on the Council’s substantive 
policy choices in the case study, judicial review also appears to have at least 
somewhat improved its compliance with the due process requirements set out in 
CJEU case law in individual listing decisions. The empirical evidence suggests 
a learning curve in the Council’s practices. Over time, the Council seems to have 
internalized notification requirements and the obligation to state reasons. While 
in the early cases in the dataset courts often annulled sanctions on grounds of 
failure to state reasons, the later cases generally turned on the issue of 
evidence.155 
The outcomes of second and third challenges also reflect a learning curve 
in the Council’s compliance with due process. Those cases are instructive 
because they tell us how the EU courts themselves have assessed the Council’s 
compliance with due process in do-overs of sanctions decisions. The Council 
successfully defended twenty-five out of thirty-two designations that the courts 
previously struck down. 
Of course, this is not a perfect track record. In five second challenges, the 
EU courts annulled sanctions for a second time. In an additional two cases, 
pertaining to the Iranian shipping company HTTS and Sina Bank, the GC even 
struck down the applicants’ designations for a third time.156 In its third HTTS 
decision the GC was clearly displeased with the Council’s handling of the 
company’s repeated designations. It did not suspend the annulment of the 
sanctions as it normally does, and it ordered the Council to pay the applicants’ 
costs.157 In addition, one could argue that the Council’s success on repeat 
challenges is due to its reliance on broader, easier to satisfy listing criteria rather 
than to better procedural standards.158 
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Still, there is evidence to suggest that at least some of the Council’s success 
on repeat challenges can be attributed to improvements in the quality of listing 
proposals and the evidence on which they rely.159 Both the Council and 
individual member States have worked to improve the quality of the evidence 
supporting listing proposals, including greater reliance on open source material 
that can be shared with the designated person or entity.160 Taken together with 
the Council’s success rate on repeat challenges, these measures indicate that the 
Council has learned and improved its practices with respect to individual due 
process rights as a result of judicial intervention. 
Importantly, the Council’s learning curve seems to extend beyond the Iran 
and Syria cases, as a senior Council legal adviser remarked: 
[T]he trend in the Council improving its record before the courts has got much better 
. . . [I]n 2012, 2013 and 2014 the Council was still losing twice as many cases as it 
won, which is not good at all. In 2015 that trend was reversed; the Council won more 
than twice as many cases as it lost. The same applies for 2016.161 
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that procedural judicial review in 
the CJEU sanctions case study compelled EU policymakers to genuinely revisit 
their substantive sanctions policy decisions and raise procedural standards. What 
emerges is a collaborative policymaking process, in which courts oversee 
compliance with individual procedural rights in listing practices while leaving 
the substantive policy judgments—deciding the fate of each sanctioned person 
or entity and the content of the listing criteria—to the EU Council. Although 
judicial review imposed substantial bureaucratic burdens on the Council, those 
burdens did not definitively preclude any policy options. 
C. CJEU Procedural Review—The Wider Perspective 
Judicial review has influenced EU sanctions policies beyond individual 
designation decisions in at least one important way. The Council responded to 
early sanctions cases by introducing systemic procedural safeguards in its listing 
practices, which practically did not exist prior to judicial intervention.162 
But the posture of the EU courts in sanctions cases could potentially affect 
EU sanctions policies in subtle and likely unintended ways, by changing the 
incentive structure of EU policymakers. The practice of rigorous judicial review 
and frequent annulments of individual sanctions imposes substantial 
bureaucratic burdens on the Council, considering the volume of sanctions 
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litigation and the significant resources the Council has dedicated to maintaining 
the various EU sanctions regimes. These bureaucratic costs might encourage the 
European Union to move away from targeted individual sanctions to country or 
sector-wide sanctions, which fall outside the purview of EU courts. This could 
substantially increase potential harm to individual rights. The bureaucratic costs 
of maintaining the sanctions regimes might also have a chilling effect on the 
European Union’s resort to sanctions in its foreign and security policy. 
Furthermore, EU courts have rewarded broad listing criteria. They have 
upheld listings based on the broad criterion of “providing support to the 
Government of Iran,” while making it difficult for the Council to defend listings 
based on more precisely tailored criteria, such as involvement in nuclear 
proliferation and sanctions circumvention.163 They have thus facilitated a 
hydraulic mechanism, through which the Council has remedied procedural flaws 
in individual listings by relying on broad listing criteria. 
The incentive structure the EU courts have created could paradoxically 
expose more individuals to sanctions—the opposite of what the courts probably 
aimed to achieve. It raises the concern that procedural judicial review ultimately 
had damaging ripple effects, even if it did help to improve the Council’s 
compliance with due process requirements in particular designations and to weed 
out non-essential sanctions. 
These concerns, however, seem to be exaggerated. For the moment, there 
is little sign that judicial review has chilled the European Union’s resort to 
sanctions. Of course, the existence or absence of a chilling effect is difficult to 
gauge, since we do not know how the Council would have acted absent the 
restraints of judicial review. That being said, the European Union has only 
expanded its use of sanctions in the decade or so since the early CJEU individual 
sanctions decisions, even in the face of persistent judicial intervention.164 
There are also reasons to doubt that judicial review in the case study truly 
exposed more individuals to sanctions. While it is true that the Council often 
relied on the criterion of “support to the Government of Iran” to remedy 
procedural flaws in individual designations, that criterion was not merely a tool 
for the Council to fend off EU courts. Its inclusion in the Iran sanctions regime 
was motivated by independent and arguably legitimate policy reasons, as part of 
a broader push by the United States and the European Union to increase pressure 
on Iran.165 
Moreover, broad listing criteria have costs that reduce the appeal of 
expending criteria for purely instrumental reasons—that is, for the sole purpose 
of avoiding judicial annulment of sanctions. Unnecessarily broad criteria (from 
a policy perspective) deter legitimate and desirable behavior, increase the 
compliance costs EU persons and companies are forced to incur to avoid 
sanctions violations, and are bound to draw the ire of affected industries within 
the European Union. Such criteria expansions might also have adverse effects on 
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the success of EU policy concerning the target States or entities. It is possible to 
imagine scenarios in which too much economic pressure might prove 
counterproductive. In other words, the costs of excessively broad criteria 
counterbalance the incentives to expand criteria created by the courts. 
Finally, the Council’s frequent resort to broad listing criteria was, at least 
in part, due to the absence of procedures for considering classified material in 
EU courts. The lack of sufficient safeguards to ensure confidentiality has pushed 
policymakers to rely on broad criteria to avoid having to share classified 
information with the courts and the designated persons and entities. Broad listing 
criteria are not a necessary outcome of procedural judicial review that account 
for the need for confidentiality in the area of foreign affairs and national 
security.166 It would be interesting to see how the new CJEU procedures 
concerning classified material, if and when put to use, might affect the dynamic 
between EU courts and policymakers in the future.167 
The EU courts, for their part, have signaled to the Council that its policy 
leeway is not limitless.168 Although the courts have rejected proportionality 
claims and challenges to the legality of certain listing criteria in the cases 
reviewed in this study, the possibility that they would invalidate sanctions on 
those grounds if the Council exhibited bad faith in its sanctioning practices 
remained on the table. The prospect of such potential judicial intervention served 
as a further indirect constraint on policymakers and as a safeguard against abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article offers an empirical study of the dynamic between EU courts 
and policymakers in one category of foreign and security matters. It assesses the 
effects of the procedural model of judicial review that the courts have employed. 
Although this case study does not advance any robust normative conclusions, it 
does shine new light on the debate about the role of courts in foreign affairs and 
national security and the interplay between policy and procedure more broadly. 
The empirical findings suggest that while judicial review did not change 
the situation of the majority of the persons and entities that have sought judicial 
remedy, it was successful in eliciting policymakers’ preferences, eliminating 
excessive sanctions, and encouraging the EU Council to adhere to more robust 
procedures before sanctions are imposed. At the same time, the CJEU’s due 
process approach preserved the Council’s autonomy in designing and 
implementing substantive policy, giving due deference to its expertise in the area 
of foreign and security policy. Procedural review therefore facilitated a dynamic 
 
 166. Cf. Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing a challenge to the 
designation of Kadi under the U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) program, after 
reviewing the classified record). 
 167. For a discussion of the potential implications of the introduction of the Closed Material 
Procedure on targeted sanctions litigation in the EU courts, see HOUSE OF LORDS HEARING, supra note 
55, at 11. 
 168. See supra note 126. In interpreting the broad criterion of providing support to the 
government of Iran, the EU courts signaled that there might be limits to the Council’s power to expend 
designation criteria. Id. 
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of accountability without substantially hindering policymakers’ ability to 
achieve their policy goals. 
ANNEX I 
The Evolving Listing Criteria 
 
A. Iran (2007-JCPOA) 
 







2007, art. 7, 
2007 O.J. (L 
103) 1 (EC) 
2. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held 
or controlled by the persons, entities and bodies listed in 
Annex V shall be frozen. Annex V shall include natural and 
legal persons, entities and bodies, not covered by Annex IV 
[Sanctions implementing UNSC resolutions], who, in 
accordance with Article 5(1)(b) of Common Position 
2007/140/CFSP, have been identified as: 
(a) being engaged in, directly associated with, or 
providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities, or 
(b) being engaged in, directly associated with, or 
providing support for, Iran’s development of nuclear weapon 
delivery systems, or 
(c) acting on behalf of or at the direction of a person, 
entity or body referred to under (a) or (b), or 
(d) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by a person, entity or body referred to under (a) or 








2010, art. 16, 
2010 O.J. (L 
281) 1 (EU) 
2. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held 
or controlled by the persons, entities and bodies listed in 
Annex VIII shall be frozen. Annex VIII shall include the 
natural and legal persons, entities and bodies, not covered by 
Annex VII [Sanctions implementing UNSC resolutions], who, 
in accordance with Article 20(1)(b) of Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP, have been identified as: 
(a) being engaged in, directly associated with, or 
providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems by Iran, including through involvement in the 
procurement of prohibited goods and technology, or being 
owned or controlled by such a person, entity or body, 
including through illicit means, or acting on their behalf or at 
their direction; 
(b) being a natural or legal person, entity or body that has 
assisted a listed person, entity or body to evade or violate the 
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provisions of this Regulation, Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP or UNSCR 1737 (2006), UNSCR 1747 
(2007), UNSCR 1803 (2008) and UNSCR 1929 (2010); 
(c) being a senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps or a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or by one 
o[r] more of its senior members; 
(d) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 









2012, art. 23, 
2012, O.J. (L 
88) 1 (EU) 
2. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held 
or controlled by the persons, entities and bodies listed in 
Annex IX shall be frozen. Annex IX shall include the natural 
and legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with 
Article 20(1)(b) and (c) of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, 
have been identified as: 
(a) being engaged in, directly associated with, or 
providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems by Iran, including through involvement in the 
procurement of prohibited goods and technology, or being 
owned or controlled by such a person, entity or body, 
including through illicit means, or acting on their behalf or at 
their direction; 
(b) being a natural or legal person, entity or body that has 
assisted a listed person, entity or body to evade or violate the 
provisions of this Regulation, Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP or UNSCR 1737 (2006), UNSCR 1747 
(2007), UNSCR 1803 (2008) and UNSCR 1929 (2010); 
(c) being a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or a legal person, entity or body owned or controlled by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or by one of more of 
its members, or natural or legal persons acting on their behalf; 
(d) being other persons, entities or bodies that provide 
support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the 
Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with 
them; 
(e) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 







Same as March 2012, amending criterion (e): 
(e) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
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Aug. 2, 2012, 
art.1, 2012 
O.J. (L 208) 1 
(EU) 











O.J. (L 356) 
34 (EU) 
Article 23 [of Regulation 267/2012, March 2012] is amended 
as follows: 
(a) in paragraph 2, points (c) and (d) are replaced by the 
following: 
“(c) being a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or a legal person, entity or body owned or controlled by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or by one or more of 
its members, or natural or legal persons acting on their behalf 
or providing insurance or other essential services to them; 
(d) being other persons, entities or bodies that provide 
support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the 
Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by them, 







2013, art. 1, 
2013 O.J. (L 
272) 1 (EU) 
Article 23(2) of Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 is amended as 
follows: 
(a) Point (b) is replaced by the following: “(b) being a 
natural or legal person, entity or body that has evaded or 
violated, or assisted a listed person, entity or body to evade or 
violate, the provisions of this Regulation, Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP or UNSCR 1737 (2006), UNSCR 1747 
(2007), UNSCR 1803 (2008) and UNSCR 1929 (2010).” 
(b) Point (c) is replaced by the following: 
“(c) being a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) or a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by the IRGC or by one or more of its members, or a 
natural or legal person, entity or body acting on their behalf, or 
a natural or legal person, entity or body providing insurance or 
other essential services to IRGC, or to entities owned or 
controlled by them or acting on their behalf.” 
(c) Point (e) is replaced by the following: 
“(e) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 
controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
(IRISL), or a natural or legal person, entity or body acting on 
its behalf, or a natural or legal person, entity or body providing 
insurance or other essential services to IRISL, or to entities 










(Adding listing criteria in light of the JCPOA) 
The following Article is added: 
Article 23a 
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, 
2019] Foreign Affairs in Court 47 
2015, art. 
1(13), 2015 
O.J. (L 274) 1 
(EU) 
owned, held or controlled by the persons, entities and bodies 
listed in Annex XIII shall be frozen. Annex XIII includes the 
natural and legal persons, entities and bodies designated by the 
U.N. Security Council in accordance with paragraph 6(c) of 
Annex B to UNSCR 2231 (2015). 
2. All funds and economic resources belonging to, 
owned, held or controlled by the persons, entities and bodies 
listed in Annex XIV shall be frozen. Annex XIV shall include 
the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies who, in 
accordance with Article 20(1)(e) of Council 
Decision 2010/413/CFSP, have been identified as: 
(a) being engaged in, directly associated with, or 
provided support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities undertaken contrary to Iran’s commitments in the 
JCPOA or the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems by Iran, including through the involvement in 
procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials 
and technology specified in the statement set out in Annex B to 
UNSCR 2231 (2015), Decision 2010/413/CFSP or the 
Annexes to this Regulation; 
(b) assisting designated persons or entities in evading or 
acting inconsistently with the JCPOA, UNSCR 2231 (2015), 
Decision 2010/413/CFSP or this Regulation; 
(c) acting on behalf or at the direction of designated 
persons or entities; or 
(d) being a legal person, entity or body owned or 





 Measure Criteria 
May 2011 Council 
Regulation 
442/2011 of 
May 9, 2011, 
arts. 4-5, 
2011 O.J. (L 
121) 1 (EU) 
Article 4: 
4(1). All funds and economic resources belonging to, 
owned, held or controlled by the natural or legal persons, 
entities and bodies listed in Annex II shall be frozen. 
Article 5: 
5(1). Annex II shall consist of a list of natural or legal 
persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with Article 
4(1) of Decision 2011/273/CFSP, have been identified by the 
Council as being persons and entities responsible for the 
violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, and 
natural or legal persons and entities associated with them. 
 
September Council Article 5(1) [of Regulation 442/2011] is replaced by the 
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2011 Regulation 
878/2011 of 
Sept. 2, 2011, 
art 1(3), 2011 
O.J. (L 228) 1 
(EU) 
following: 
1. Annex II shall consist of a list of natural or legal 
persons, entities and bodies which, in accordance with Article 
4(1) of Decision 2011/273/CFSP, have been identified by the 
Council as being persons responsible for the violent repression 
against the civilian population in Syria, persons and entities 
benefiting from or supporting the regime, or persons and 






Jan. 18, 2012, 
arts. 14-15, 
2012 O.J. (L 
16) 1 (EU) 
[Annexes II and IIa to the Regulation contain the lists of 
persons and entities subject to an asset freeze] 
(a) Annex II shall consist of a list of natural or legal 
persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with Article 
19(1) of Decision 2011/782/CFSP, have been identified by the 
Council as being persons or entities responsible for the violent 
repression against the civilian population in Syria, persons and 
entities benefiting from or supporting the regime, and natural 
or legal persons and entities associated with them, and to 
whom Article 21 of this Regulation shall not apply; 
(b) Annex IIa shall consist of a list of entities which, in 
accordance with Article 19(1) of Decision 2011/782/CFSP, 
have been identified by the Council as being entities 
associated with the persons or entities responsible for the 
violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, or 
with persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the 
regime, and to which Article 21 of this Regulation shall apply. 
 






Oct. 12, 2015, 
art 1, 2015 
O.J. (L 266) 1 
(EU) 
Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 is amended as follows: 
(1) In Article 15, the following paragraphs are added: 
1a. The list in Annex II shall also consist of natural or 
legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with 
Article 28(2) of Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP (*), have 
been identified by the Council as falling within one of the 
following categories: 
(a) leading businesspersons operating in Syria; 
(b) members of the Assad or Makhlouf families; 
(c) Syrian Government Ministers in power after May 
2011; 
(d) members of the Syrian Armed Forces of the rank of 
“colonel” or the equivalent or higher in post after May 2011; 
(e) members of the Syrian security and intelligence 
services in post after May 2011; 
(f) members of the regime-affiliated militias; 
(g) persons, entities, units, agencies, bodies or 
institutions operating in the chemical weapons proliferation 
sector; 
and natural or legal persons and entities associated with 
them, and to whom Article 21 of this Regulation does not 
apply. 
ANNEX II 
















1. Iran Melli Bank PLC Dismissed -- Dismissed -- -- 
2. Iran Bank Melli Iran Dismissed -- Dismissed -- -- 





4. Iran Bateni Struck down Yes 
Struck 
down ID** -- 
5. Iran Sina Bank Struck Yes* Struck Yes Struck 
 
 169. See the cases cited supra note 102. 
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down  down down 
 










down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
8. Iran North Drilling Struck down Yes 
Struck 
down ID -- 
9. Iran Sharif University of Technology 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
10. Iran Iran Insurance Company 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
11. Iran Post Bank Iran Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 




down ID -- 






down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
15. Iran Bank Refah Kargaran 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
16. Iran IRISL Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
17. Iran Hafize Darya Shipping Co. 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
18. Iran Khazar Sea Shipping Lines Co. 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
19. Iran IRISL Europe GmbH 
Struck 






down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
21. Iran Irano Misr Shipping Co. 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
22. Iran Safiran Payam Darya Shipping Co. 
Struck 












down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
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25. Iran Hoopad Darya Shipping Agency 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
26. Iran Valfajr Shipping Co. 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
27. Iran Bank Tejarat Struck down Yes Dismissed   
28. Syria Samir Hassan Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
29. Syria Mohammad Makhlouf Dismissed -- Dismissed -- -- 
30. Syria Mohamad Hamcho Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
31. Syria Hamcho International 
Struck 
down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
32. Syria Khaled Kaddour Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
33. Syria Aiman Jaber Struck down Yes Dismissed -- -- 
 * Maintained. Sina Bank and the Central Bank of Iran are not 
“clean” examples of post-decision relisting. At the time the courts decided 
their first challenges they had already been relisted by the Council, but the 
relisting measures fell outside the scope of the judgments for procedural 
reasons. The second round of litigation covered those later measures 
although they were already in place when the first decisions were 
delivered. 
** Sanctions lifted on JCPOA implementation day, rendering the 
decision whether to relist moot.  
 
 
